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  INTRODUCTION   
As a wave of massive corporate scandals overwhelms our 
lives, calls to hold corporate boards accountable grow louder each 
day.1 Just this fall, hackers rummaged through Equifax’s rec-
ords to obtain financial information for 143 million Americans.2 
Customers of Wells Fargo, the nation’s third largest bank, saw 
their hard-earned money routed to 3.5 million fictitious ac-
counts, frittered away on frivolous fees, and wasted on unwanted 
car insurance.3 Auto-manufacturers General Motors and 
Volkswagen made billion-dollar payments after failing to un-
cover critical defects in auto parts, resulting in many deaths and 
injuries4 and environmental damage.5 Yahoo, the one-time In-
ternet giant, announced that over 3 billion email accounts were 
compromised by Russian hackers in the largest security breach 
in Internet history.6 And following a crude awakening to wide-
spread sexual harassment in the workplace,7 many corporations 
are viewed as tolerating repeated violations by powerful and 
 
 1. See, e.g., Emily Flitter et al., How Wells Fargo and Federal Reserve 
Struck Deal to Hold Bank’s Board Accountable, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/wells-fargo-fed-board-directors 
-penalties.html (describing negotiations between the Federal Reserve and the 
board of Wells Fargo after the Federal Reserve imposed sanctions on Wells 
Fargo for fraudulent charges to customers). 
 2. See Ron Lieber & Stacy Cowley, Trying to Stem Fallout from Breach, 
Equifax Replaces C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/09/26/business/equifax-ceo.html. 
 3. See Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo’s Year of Scandal Stretches On, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargos-year-of-scandal 
-stretches-on-1504863001; Gretchen Morgenson, Wells Fargo Forced Unwanted 
Auto Insurance on Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/07/27/business/wells-fargo-unwanted-auto-insurance.html.  
 4. See Richard Read, GM’s Ignition Switch Findings: 124 Deaths, 275 In-
juries, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/cars/gms 
-ignition-switch-findings-124-deaths-275-injuries/2015/08/25/2ad3a7d4-4b44 
-11e5-80c2-106ea7fb80d4_story.html. 
 5. See Shannon Hall, VW Causes Small but Irreversible Environmental 
Damage, SCI. AM. (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ 
vw-scandal-causes-small-but-irreversible-environmental-damage. 
 6. Yahoo Provides Notice to Additional Users Affected by Previously Dis-
closed 2013 Data Theft, OATH (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.oath.com/press/yahoo 
-provides-notice-to-additional-users-affected-by-previously (summarizing Ya-
hoo’s announcement that “all user accounts were affected by the August 2013 
data theft,” instead of only the one billion accounts previously disclosed). 
 7. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could 
Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/ 
metoo-law-legal-system.html. 
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popular figures. With repercussions of such immense scale, poli-
cymakers8 and the broader public are left wondering whether 
corporate boards are simply incompetent or ultimately com-
plicit.9 
This critical distinction matters not only in the court of pub-
lic opinion, but also in the courts of law. Under the most common 
legal bases, which we discuss below, mere incompetence would 
exculpate an otherwise well-intentioned board, whereas failure 
to respond to glaring problems results in liability. To differenti-
ate between these two outcomes, our legal system has increas-
ingly turned to companies’ internal monitoring efforts through 
their compliance apparatus. For over a decade, federal regula-
tors and criminal authorities have directed companies to inten-
sify their compliance efforts, often in return for more favorable 
regulatory treatment.10 The response has been swift and impres-
sive. Compliance departments in most public companies today 
engage hundreds of employees on average, and retain thousands 
of staff in highly regulated industries such as finance.11 With ex-
panding firepower at their disposal, the heads of legal and com-
pliance departments find themselves in an increasingly elevated 
position within the corporate hierarchy, having gained a seat 
among top managers and a direct reporting avenue to the 
board.12 
But while companies have committed unprecedented re-
sources to build up their compliance operations, the results of 
their efforts are very much in doubt. Some corporate law schol-
ars question whether in-house officers are well placed to super-
vise their superiors, such as the CEO and the board.13 Others 
 
 8. See Gretchen Morgenson, Wells Fargo Borrower Got Unneeded Insur-
ance, and Ruined Credit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/08/18/business/wells-fargo-loan-auto-insurance.html. 
 9. See David Gelles, ‘You Should Be Fired’: Wells Fargo C.E.O. Faces Blis-
tering Attacks From Senators, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/10/03/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-ceo-senate-hearing.html. 
 10. See infra text accompanying Part I.A.1. 
 11. See Jill Treanor, JP Morgan Chase Hires 3,000 New Staff in Its Com-
pliance Department, GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
business/2013/sep/17/jpmorgan-banking (describing the infamous “London 
Whale” debacle, where JP Morgan hired 3000 new compliance staff and reas-
signed 1000 employees for a total increase of 4000 staff members); see also Press 
Release, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Bank Reports First Quarter 2017 Net In-
come of €575 Million (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.db.com/newsroom_news/ 
2017q1-media-release.pdf (reporting that Deutsche Bank increased its compli-
ance staff by over 2000 employees after recent failures). 
 12. See infra text accompanying Part I.B. 
 13. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the 
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mistrust company employees as monitors, arguing that their in-
sider perspective and loyalty to their firm will prevent them from 
seeing fraud and wrongdoing.14 Still others have dismissed com-
pliance as institutionally ill-suited to the board-centric edifice of 
corporate law.15 Perhaps the harshest critics view compliance as 
a box-checking exercise, too formalistic and weak to uncover cor-
porate malfeasance.16 Overall, current scholarship on compli-
ance from a variety of perspectives reaches mostly negative con-
clusions. 
While we share many of these concerns, our bottom line is 
considerably more optimistic. We come to a different outcome be-
cause we uncover a different pathway through which legal and 
compliance officers can wield influence that is not emphasized in 
prior research. We agree with existing scholarship that in-house 
legal and compliance experts rarely have the means or bargain-
ing power to command top management or board members to 
stop violating the law. But expecting them to do so would be mis-
placed. Rather, we argue that legal and compliance officers have 
great power because they can alter board members’ incentives, 
and ensure that board members become aware of information 
they might prefer to ignore. If the chief legal or compliance of-
ficer chooses to inform the board of a critical problem, it becomes 
much harder for directors to do nothing and still meet the good 
faith requirements of our laws. This internal report can flip the 
board’s state of mind from blissful, even if negligent, ignorance 
to stark awareness. Hence, legal and compliance officers’ hidden 
power lies in their ability to trigger board action by formally no-
tifying the board of a problem, or alternatively shielding the 
board from this formal notification and allowing board members 
to preserve the veneer of ignorance. 
This hidden power of compliance, we argue, sprang up un-
expectedly over the last decade from parallel case law develop-
ments in Delaware fiduciary duty jurisprudence, federal securi-
ties regulation, and personal liability for compliance officers. We 
trace these doctrinal developments to explain how a renewed 
 
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2003); see also Robert C. Bird & Stephen 
Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 203, 204–05 (2016). 
 14. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside 
Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 988 (2005). 
 15. See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and 
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 590 (2008). 
 16. See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 933, 941 (2017). 
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emphasis on evidence of awareness boosted the standing of legal 
and compliance officers in the eyes of the board, while also 
threatening board members with liability if they fail.17 We then 
reveal how this works in practice by analyzing the interactions 
between the board and its legal and compliance officers through 
evidence released in four major recent scandals: the GM ignition 
switch scandal, the Washington Mutual mortgage meltdown, the 
Yahoo security breach, and the Wells Fargo fake accounts scan-
dal.18 
When the Delaware Supreme Court first confirmed, in its 
landmark 2006 Stone v. Ritter opinion,19 that board members 
would be liable for failing to monitor misconduct only if found to 
be acting in bad faith, much of legal academia burst out in des-
pair.20 To meet such a demanding evidentiary standard, plain-
tiffs would need to provide unambiguous evidence of the direc-
tors’ and officers’ states of mind, thought notoriously hard to 
obtain. For critics, Delaware had just handed out another victory 
to boards. Even fervid advocates of the discretion Stone affords 
to boards did not question that proving bad faith would be truly 
cumbersome.21 
To upend this widely shared belief in the literature, we 
closely analyze post-Stone jurisprudence from the last ten years 
in Part II, detailing the facets of bad faith in the various prongs 
of Delaware’s monitoring doctrine. Our argument here is not 
that Delaware law has turned out more generous than critics 
feared. Rather, we argue that the precise line that Delaware ju-
risprudence has drawn around bad faith allows legal and com-
pliance personnel to formulate their communications with the 
board in a manner that can either expose it to liability or shield 
it from it. The dramatic increase in monitoring resources since 
 
 17. See infra Parts II–IV. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 
2006). 
 20. See, e.g., Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Directors’ Duties, 
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271, 307 (2014). See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Story 
of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor, 
in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (arguing that the 
importance of Caremark may have been exaggerated); Eric J. Pan, Rethinking 
The Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 
38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209 (2011) (viewing Delaware doctrine as too narrow). 
 21. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The De-
fining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010) (under-
lining Chancellor Allen’s intention to avoid subjecting directors to broad liabil-
ity).  
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Stone has positioned legal and compliance officers to bridge the 
informational gap and provide the detailed reports required by 
courts to prove bad faith. For example, internal compliance re-
ports have helped shareholders win hefty settlements in cases 
about illegal drug promotion against the boards of Pfizer,22 the 
pharmaceutics giant, and Allergan,23 which produces Botox. 
Similarly, internal reports documenting failures and gaps in 
companies’ safety, risk, and compliance systems have aided 
plaintiffs in their wins against boards in diverse industries such 
as finance24 and mining.25 
As we explain in Part III below, the gravity of internal re-
ports for board liability becomes clearer when taking into ac-
count parallel developments in federal securities case law, and 
in particular under Rule 10b-5, the most popular basis for class 
actions. According to 10b-5, a corporate officer commits fraud 
only if she issues faulty disclosure with scienter, i.e. she is aware 
of such faults or, at least reckless in not recognizing them.26 In 
2007, just a year after Stone, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tell-
abs v. Makor raised the evidentiary standard for successfully 
pleading scienter, effectively requiring hard evidence of aware-
ness or recklessness.27 As a result, the lines demarcating scien-
ter and bad faith essentially coincide, as courts themselves have 
recognized.28 Consequently, securities plaintiffs often pore over 
internal records of communications between boards and their le-
gal and compliance officers to unearth evidence of scienter. Se-
curities class actions have traditionally far exceeded fiduciary 
duty claims in terms of awards won, and are recently reaching 
new heights.29 Thus, interactions between legal and compliance 
officers and the board have never been more critical. 
Compliance officers have not only gained greater influence 
due to their role in communicating with corporate boards, but 
have also been held personally liable when they failed to do so. 
 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 224–31. 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 211–20. 
 24. See infra text accompanying notes 221–23. 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 231–41. 
 26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
 27. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) 
(holding that although the evidence need not be a “smoking gun,” it must be 
“cogent and compelling” in light of other explanations). 
 28. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006). 
 29. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS 2017 
MIDYEAR ASSESSMENT 1 (2017), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/ 
Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2017-Midyear-Assessment. 
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In a highly controversial move, the SEC sanctioned the Chief 
Compliance Officers in financial giants Blackrock and SFX for 
tolerating gaps in their compliance systems, even though they 
were not aware of illegal conduct occurring due to these gaps.30 
In another example, the U.S. Attorney’s Office brought charges 
for obstruction of justice against a Volkswagen legal counsel, 
whose vague instructions for record keeping gave the signal to 
employees to destroy evidence right around the emissions scan-
dal revelations.31 Although the growing threat of liability 
against legal and compliance personnel has the profession up in 
arms, it eventually strengthens their hand vis-à-vis the board, 
as we argue in Part IV. By pointing to potential personal liabil-
ity, legal and compliance heads are empowered to resist any un-
due pressure to turn a blind eye. 
These developments in Delaware corporate law, federal se-
curities law, and personal liability for legal and compliance offic-
ers are transforming the legal treatment of corporate misconduct 
in practice. The fines, payouts to plaintiffs, and other sanctions 
resulting from corporate debacles nowadays are negotiated in 
light of the evidence trail against management and boards left 
behind by legal and compliance officers. To analyze this dynamic 
in practice, we present case studies focusing on four mega-scan-
dals: the General Motors ignition switch failure, the Washington 
Mutual collapse during the financial crisis, the security breach 
in Yahoo, and Wells Fargo’s fake accounts fiasco.32 While legal 
and compliance personnel are at the heart of the inquiry in all 
cases, their interaction with the board in each setting is differ-
ent, changing the liability outcome. Some interactions effectively 
shield the board from liability, as critics feared, but other inter-
actions expose both the board and legal and compliance person-
nel to legal risks, in twists that prior literature did not predict. 
We present four different categories of interactions, which we 
term as follows for ease of reference: untraceable, traceable, in-
terrupted, and incomplete.33 
Our first category, “untraceable” communications, includes 
settings where no evidentiary trail connects the heads of legal 
and compliance departments with ongoing violations or red 
flags, and no communication with the board happens on record. 
With no hard evidence of awareness, the board is off the hook, as 
 
 30. See infra text accompanying notes 290–95. 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 300–06. 
 32. See infra Part V. 
 33. Id. 
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was the case in the General Motors (GM) ignition switch scandal. 
Despite settling over 100 lawsuits pointing to a potential me-
chanical failure, lower-tier in-house lawyers, apparently content 
with the small payouts to plaintiffs they secured, failed to ele-
vate the issue to the chief legal counsel’s attention.34 As a result 
of the ensuing delay in uncovering the problem, hundreds suf-
fered death or injury, and the company paid billions in fines, set-
tlements, and other sanctions.35 This negative outcome has pre-
dictably monopolized academic assessments of compliance, since 
it absolves both board and legal personnel despite their disas-
trous omissions. We bring to light the other scenarios below, 
where the outcome for corporate actors is less favorable. 
Our second category, “traceable” communications, repre-
sents the polar opposite of the one above, with on-record interac-
tions between the board and legal and compliance officers, who 
provide well-informed reports of employees’ illegal acts or red 
flags. Such a clear evidentiary link between corporate failures 
and the board’s state of mind is what the architects of compliance 
are hoping to achieve. For an illustration of this theoretical ideal 
on the ground, we turn to the failure of Washington Mutual 
(WaMu), the largest savings and loan association that collapsed 
during the 2007 financial crisis with assets of about $300 bil-
lion.36 WaMu’s board pursued an aggressive mortgage origina-
tion strategy, despite repeated warnings by successive compli-
ance officers that the mortgage documentation prevented them 
from meeting, or even accurately assessing, the institution’s risk 
levels as required by law.37 The resulting settlement between the 
board and the FDIC, who took over the floundering institution, 
included a rare out-of-pocket payment by board members.38 
As our next two categories demonstrate, interactions be-
tween the board and legal and compliance personnel are not al-
 
 34. See ANTON R. VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL 
MOTORS COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS 1 (2014) [hereinafter 
VALUKAS REPORT], https://www.aieg.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Valukas 
-report-on-gm-redacted2.pdf. 
 35. See infra text accompanying notes 324–29. 
 36. See Robin Sidel et al., WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, In 
Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2008), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/SB122238415586576687. 
 37. See infra text accompanying notes 354–58. 
 38. See Kevin M. LaCroix, A Closer Look at the WaMu FDIC Settlement, 
D&O DIARY (Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.dandodiary.com/2011/12/articles/ 
failed-banks/a-closer-look-at-the-wamu-fdic-settlement. 
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ways as clear-cut as in our first two examples. In our third set-
ting, which we term “interrupted” communications, information 
about underlying violations reaches top legal and compliance of-
ficers, who never communicate it officially to the board, perhaps 
out of loyalty as critics fear. Although this interruption protects 
the board from liability, it can generate risks for legal and com-
pliance personnel who may be seen as engineering it, as in the 
Yahoo example we discuss. In what became the largest cyber-
security breach in history, Russian hackers compromised over 3 
billion accounts, selling personal financial information online for 
financial crime or espionage.39 Although red flags had reached 
the chief legal officer of Yahoo, an independent investigation 
found that he neither pursued a full-scale investigation nor 
alerted the board officially.40 When revelations of the hack en-
gulfed the board, the independent investigation documented the 
red flags and faulted the chief legal officer for not following 
through.41 Protecting itself behind this lack of communication, 
the board publicly blamed the chief legal counsel, who promptly 
resigned.42 He now also finds himself embroiled in related litiga-
tion.43 According to industry commentators and plaintiffs alike, 
the board used the chief legal counsel as a scapegoat.44 
In our final setting, where communications were “incom-
plete,” legal and compliance personnel are aware of apparent red 
flags, but instead of turning a blind eye they opt for half-hearted 
investigations and vague communications to the board. From the 
outside, it may seem like the compliance apparatus is humming 
along so as to justify the board’s good faith, but no incriminating 
information ever comes to the surface. If this was the strategy in 
 
 39. See Yahoo Provides Notice, supra note 6. 
 40. Yahoo! Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 47 (Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter 
Yahoo 2016 10-K], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/ 
000119312517065791/d293630d10k.htm; see also infra Part V.C. 
 41. Yahoo 2016 10-K, supra note 40 (“[T]he legal team had sufficient infor-
mation to warrant substantial further inquiry . . . and they did not sufficiently 
pursue it.”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Yahoo Accused of Mismanaging Millions in Humanitarian Trust 
Funds Intended for Chinese Political Dissidents, COHEN MILSTEIN (Apr. 11, 
2017), https://www.cohenmilstein.com/update/yahoo-accused-mismanaging 
-millions-humanitarian-trust-funds-intended-chinese-political (alleging that 
Yahoo executives, including Bell, turned a blind eye to the misuse of funds). 
 44. See David Ruiz, Silicon Valley GCs Defend Ron Bell; Say He’s the Fall 
Guy, RECORDER (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/ 
1202780410330 (observing that many of Ron Bell’s colleagues supported him, 
even after his very public resignation). 
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the Wells Fargo fake accounts scandal, it clearly did not work. 
Opening fictitious accounts was so widespread among bank em-
ployees that even the press featured stories about misconduct.45 
For years, the chief legal and compliance officers watched over 
underwhelming attempts to collect information, hesitated to in-
terview top bank executives, and submitted inconclusive reports 
to the board.46 When the scandal erupted, those lackluster ef-
forts and the shreds of evidence left behind engulfed all corpo-
rate actors. Top executives and compliance officers stepped 
down, had their compensation clawed back, and found them-
selves targeted by private plaintiffs and regulators.47 To top it 
all off, the Federal Reserve took the unprecedented move of 
pushing for a removal of all board members, illustrating that 
failures of that extent are hard to tolerate.48 
We develop this argument in the paragraphs below. We first 
document the revolutionary growth of compliance departments 
in the last decade and the deep skepticism of legal academia to-
wards that development. We then show how influential legal and 
compliance personnel are in creating an evidentiary path that 
can establish board liability, analyzing recent developments in 
Delaware and federal securities law. We argue that the small 
but growing number of cases imposing personal liability on un-
derperforming compliance officers constitutes a backstop to un-
due pressures. Our case studies illustrate the application of this 
framework. 
 
 45. See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo Fires Workers Accused of Cheat-
ing on Sales Goals, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/ 
oct/03/business/la-fi-mo-wells-fargo-workers-fired-20131003 (discussing Wells 
Fargo’s issues with sales pressures even before the larger fake accounts scandal 
broke). 
 46. See INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICES 
INVESTIGATION REPORT 11–18 (2017) [hereinafter WELLS FARGO INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS REPORT], https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/ 
investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf (summarizing the find-
ings of the report and discussing senior officers’ and corporate compliance or-
ganizations’ roles in allowing misconduct to continue); see also infra Part V.D. 
 47. See, e.g., In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 16-CV-
05541-JST, 2017 WL 4414304, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2017); Consolidated 
Amended Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 
(N.D.Cal. Feb. 24, 2017), 2017 WL 1044785; WELLS FARGO INDEPENDENT DI-
RECTORS REPORT, supra note 46, at i. 
 48. See Flitter et al., supra note 1. 
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I.  THE COMPLIANCE EXPLOSION REACHES THE 
BOARDROOM   
In the last ten years, the explosive growth of compliance de-
partments has redefined the corporate landscape, demanding ex-
traordinary resources and upending established corporate gov-
ernance hierarchies. Most companies today have heavily 
populated compliance teams with specialized staff.49 In fact, the 
costs of compliance have become so enormous that companies in-
creasingly use “big data” technologies to monitor their records 
more effectively.50 In turn, the corporate executives in charge of 
these small compliance armies have claimed greater attention 
from the board, rising to top management ranks.51 Some compa-
nies assign the role of leading the compliance function to the gen-
eral counsel, while others have established dedicated chief com-
pliance officers.52 Regardless of designation, these officers 
regularly update the board on the company’s exposure to legal 
risk.53 Discussions on such topics as corruption, compliance and 
ethics, and regulatory changes are now commonplace, often built 
into strategic conversations about international expansion, tal-
ent development, and new product or service offerings.54 Perhaps 
the best indication of the general counsels’ increased influence is 
their continuously rising pay, which now exceeds $2 million on 
 
 49. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 11 (noting JP Morgan Chase’s addition of 
3000 compliance staff members). 
 50. See, e.g., How Big Data Analytics Is Transforming Regulatory Compli-
ance, CREDIT SUISSE (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.credit-suisse.com/corporate/ 
en/articles/news-and-expertise/how-big-data-analytics-is-transforming 
-regulatory-compliance-201711.html (discussing how increasing Big Data usage 
led to a “45-fold increase in the number of productive alerts”). 
 51. See Langevoort, supra note 16, at 942 (noting that ethics and culture 
are now “an explicit compliance goal” and that companies increasingly have a 
Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer in order to meet this goal). 
 52. While there is debate among scholars as to whether the compliance 
function ought to be entirely separate from the general counsel, both sides agree 
that both positions should maintain direct access to the board, which is the foun-
dation for our argument. See generally Bird & Park, supra note 13, at 204–05 
(discussing the potential roles for a Chief Legal Officer in the future). But see 
BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE 
PARTNER GUARDIAN TENSION 441–44 (2016) (envisioning a dual-hatted Chief 
Legal Officer with oversight of both legal and ethical matters). 
 53. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., 2016–2017 NACD PUBLIC COMPANY GOV-
ERNANCE SURVEY 2 (2017), https://www.nacdonline.org/files/2016%E2%80% 
932017%20NACD%20Public%20Company%20Governance%20Survey% 
20Executive%20Summary.pdf. 
 54. See id. (discussing generally the topics that are most frequently ad-
dressed by boards).  
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average for S&P 500 companies and grows larger depending on 
the overall size of the compliance team.55 
This Part situates our argument in the scholarly and policy 
literature by charting out the growth of compliance and the 
scholarly accounts regarding its impact. Existing work high-
lights that companies developed their compliance operations 
partly to better respond to towering criminal and regulatory 
sanctions, and partly because they were mandated to do so by 
federal law. We then explain why corporate law and business or-
ganization scholars view the ballooning of in-house legal and 
compliance staff with skepticism. 
A. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES PUSH FOR 
COMPLIANCE 
Although employee monitoring has long been a key task for 
corporate boards under state corporate law, the meteoric rise of 
compliance in recent years has been largely the result of federal 
intervention. Faced with a proliferation of new rules and regula-
tions, both from Congress and from an ever-growing administra-
tive state,56 federal authorities looked for strategies to further 
incentivize private companies to toe the line.57 Their hope was 
that, if better-supervised, corporate staff would be less inclined 
to violate the law.58 Moreover, by instituting an internal corpo-
rate program dedicated to ensuring adherence to legal and reg-
ulatory requirements, the flow of information to regulators 
would improve.59 Ultimately, the costs of compliance programs 
are borne by shareholders rather than the public purse.60 Thus, 
 
 55. See EQUILAR, GENERAL COUNSEL PAY TRENDS 2016, at 8 (2016) (show-
ing average total compensation of $2.1 million for GCs at S&P 500 companies 
in 2016). 
 56. See, e.g., Grudges and Kludges: Too Much Federal Regulation Has Piled 
Up in America, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 2017, at 19 (“Between 1970 and 2008 the 
number of prescriptive words like ‘shall’ or ‘must’ in the code of federal regula-
tions grew from 403,000 to nearly 963,000.”). 
 57. See Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing of Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 435, 438 (2014) (observing that the government increased sanctions 
in an effort to have companies adopt more internal compliance measures). 
 58. See id. at 442–43 (2014) (“The goal of these requirements is to encour-
age companies to adopt programs that will help them do a better job policing, 
deterring wrongdoing, and creating a corporate culture of ethical and lawful 
behavior.”). 
 59. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2114 (2016) (“The SEC’s interventions in corporate 
governance have traditionally focused on measures to improve the accuracy of 
financial reporting.”). 
 60. See id. at 2121–28 (discussing compliance and shareholders’ role in 
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authorities put in place various incentives and requirements fos-
tering the establishment of compliance programs.61 
1. Fostering the Growth of Compliance 
Federal criminal authorities, called on to police a burgeon-
ing roster of corporate crimes,62 used their sanctioning power in 
order to bargain for corporate governance reforms. As early as 
1991, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines offered an up-to-ninety-
five-percent reduction in penalties for companies that had previ-
ously instituted effective compliance programs.63 But it was the 
practice of deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements 
(DPA/NPAs) that transformed compliance departments from a 
mitigating factor to a key sanctioning mechanism for corpora-
tions. These agreements, which represent a settlement between 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and targeted companies, have 
become the primary tool for criminal enforcement against corpo-
rations, utilized in over sixty-three percent of cases against cor-
porations in recent years.64 Alongside fines or other sanctions, 
DPA/NPAs often require an undertaking to dramatically expand 
and reform the company’s compliance operation.65 Following a 
DPA/NPA, companies often hire hundreds of new employees to 
broaden the scope of their compliance efforts,66 so as to avoid re-
peating the same violations in the future. Undoubtedly, eliciting 
 
management and observing that “compan[ies] pay[ ]  for the compliance pro-
gram[s]”). 
 61. See Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing Commission Amendments En-
courage a New Ethical Culture Within Organizations?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
565, 586 (2004) (“The original organizational guidelines prompted companies to 
develop compliance and ethics programs.”). 
 62. See Barkow, supra note 57, at 445 (“Despite increasing sanctions and 
the spread of corporate compliance programs . . . business crime remains a 
pressing problem.”). 
 63. See Fiorelli, supra note 61, at 567 (finding that organizations with ef-
fective compliance programs can receive up to a ninety-five percent fine reduc-
tion). 
 64. BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPRO-
MISE WITH CORPORATIONS 72 (2014). 
 65. See id.; see also Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the New Reg-
ulators: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 159, 160 (2008). 
 66. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 10, United States v. W. 
Union Co., No. 1:17-cr-00011-CCC (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.justice 
.gov/opa/press-release/file/938371/download (mandating an improved compli-
ance program); see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, United States v. 
Deutsche Bank AG, No. 3:15-cr-00061-RNC (D. Conn. Apr. 23, 2015), https:// 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/05/22/2014-04 
-23-deutsche-bank-deferred-prosecution-agreement.pdf (noting that Deutsche 
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the promise to hire an army of compliance officers alongside a 
hefty fine helps criminal authorities grab headlines and boost 
their standing in the business community and the nation more 
generally. 
Legal academics were skeptical towards compliance from 
the very start. Criminal law scholars were puzzled by the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines’ choice to offer reduced fines if a company 
established a compliance department.67 It seemed like a com-
pany could get off lightly simply by committing future resources, 
with little assurance that crime prevention would be more effec-
tive down the line.68 In fact, the emphasis on monitoring and 
procedures, hallmarks of effective compliance programs, was 
widely dismissed as simple “box checking.”69 Thinkers in the so-
cio-legal tradition have questioned whether compliance staff, in-
stead of identifying and highlighting corporate failures, suppress 
them due to peer pressure.70 Legal writers have puzzled over the 
professional responsibilities of compliance officers who are also 
 
Bank has significantly expanded its compliance operations); Western Union Fi-
nancial Services, Inc. Resolves Previously Disclosed Investigation by New York 




(“Over the past six years, Western Union increased overall compliance funding 
by more than 200 percent, and now spends approximately $200 million per year 
on compliance, with more than 20 percent of its workforce currently dedicated 
to compliance functions.”). 
 67. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 
VA. L. REV. 853 (2007) (finding a lack of uniformity in compliance requirements 
and little evidence that prosecutors keep track of these reforms after they im-
pose them); see also Fiorelli, supra note 61, at 567 (observing that, if a company 
does not establish a compliance department, it is “subject to a 400% fine multi-
plier”). 
 68. See Paul Fiorelli & Ann Marie Tracey, Why Comply? Organizational 
Guidelines Offer a Safer Harbor in the Storm, 32 J. CORP. L. 467, 471, 489 (2008) 
(discussing how revised guidelines increased the importance of compliance pro-
grams and elevated them from being simple “check the box” programs). 
 69. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Ne-
gotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 496 (2003) (observing that effective 
compliance systems “contain monitoring and auditing systems”); see, e.g., Jayne 
W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 816–17 (2008) (noting that initial drafts of 
sanctions often include monitoring provisions but that monitoring is often cut 
in subsequent drafts). 
 70. See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the 
Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1413 (1999) (“Given the role of 
top management in charting the course of legal and ethical compliance in cor-
porations, it is difficult to underestimate the importance of subtle pressures to 
walk the fine line between law abidance and law deviation.”). 
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in-house lawyers, thus bound by their duties to the corporate cli-
ent.71 
Neither of these schools of thought is particularly optimistic 
about compliance’s ability to prevent violations and ensure ad-
herence to the law.72 Rather, they betray a deep skepticism as to 
whether compliance would win corporate leaders’ support, or 
whether it would remain sidelined from core corporate govern-
ance institutions.73 The concern was that, as the newly-arrived 
hordes of compliance officers combed through the records of low-
level employees, their investigations and findings might not 
travel up the corporate chain of command.74 
2. Compliance Enters the Boardroom 
In recent years, federal criminal authorities have turned 
their attention towards pushing boards to open their doors to 
heads of compliance. DPA/NPAs often require companies to cre-
ate a channel of communication through which the head of com-
pliance can directly approach independent members of the board 
or senior executives.75 Moreover, the 2010 Amendments to the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines condition any leniency in penalties 
on whether the person with operational responsibility for the 
compliance function communicates directly with the board.76 
The 2010 Amendments go further in suggesting that the head of 
compliance provide an annual report to the board regarding the 
implementation and effectiveness of the compliance program, 
 
 71. See generally Coffee, supra note 13 (discussing the possible roles and 
potential conflicts of interest for attorneys as the gatekeepers of compliance). 
 72. See Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Pro-
grams, 39 J. CORP. L. 769, 775 (2014) (observing that the current system is not 
working, but that there are no guarantees that a different system would work 
either). 
 73. Id. (noting that “an intrinsic, ethics-based approach” has been deem-
phasized). 
 74. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Con-
trols to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 326 (2004) (“Re-
porting up the chain of command is a standard feature of internal controls and 
compliance programs. It is also one of the most difficult for . . . employees to 
meet.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 11–12, United States v. 
VimpelCom Ltd., No. 16-cr-00137 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.justice 
.gov/criminal-fraud/file/828301/download (noting the company’s FCPA viola-
tions and its requirement that the company to assign compliance oversight and 
responsibility to one or more senior corporate executives who would report di-
rectly to the Board of Directors, or any appropriate committee of the board). 
 76. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f ) (3)(C) (2018). 
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and prompt updates in case of current or potential criminal vio-
lations.77 These reports help authorities assess whether the com-
pany’s compliance department had “adequate resources” and 
“appropriate authority,” so as to accord it with the leniency al-
lowed by the law. By brandishing sanction relief as a payoff for 
reform, authorities sought to ensure that compliance heads 
would have no trouble garnering the board’s attention, thus ele-
vating compliance as a corporate priority. 
Companies responded by setting up the institutional links 
required. Private consulting services sprang up to offer opinions, 
resources, and trainings for boards on how to effectively com-
municate with their compliance officer.78 Professional associa-
tions, too, weighed in, offering specific advice regarding report-
ing structures, board committees, and the frequency of 
communication between compliance and the board.79 As a result, 
heads of compliance now have the ear of top management and 
board members, a prerogative they can utilize to raise awareness 
about illegal conduct to the board. In practice, a number of sur-
veys are revealing that compliance officers are now communi-
cating with the board more frequently than ever before.80 These 
enforcement guidelines, combined with the statutory initiatives 
outlined below, have gained in-house legal experts a position at 
the core of the action in modern corporations. 
B. NEW STATUTES INSTITUTIONALIZE COMPLIANCE 
Institutionalizing compliance as an internal corporate mon-
itoring mechanism appealed not only to criminal enforcement 
authorities, but also to Congress and other federal regulators. 
For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act requires truthful 
financial reporting practices, which would track potential 
bribes;81 this is now interpreted by the Securities and Exchange 
 
 77. Id. at cmt. 11. 
 78. See SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS, COMPLIANCE TRAINING 
AND THE BOARD 2 (2017) (stating that board training is prevalent). 
 79. See, e.g., About Us, NAT’L SOC’Y COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONALS, https:// 
nscp.org/about-us (highlighting “continuing education to further [compliance 
professionals’] knowledge and specialized skills, and regulatory involvement 
through representation of compliance interests”). 
 80. See Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Prelim-
inary Findings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 473 
(2008) (“The large majority of respondents reported directly to the Chief Execu-
tive Officer or Chair of the Board.”). 
 81. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 § 103(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd–1(a). 
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Commission (SEC) as essentially mandating a thorough compli-
ance effort.82 At other times, Congress has instituted a special-
ized compliance process, such as the anti-money laundering sus-
picious activity reporting.83 Along these lines, a large number of 
congressional statutes institutionalize compliance processes in a 
range of fields such as environmental standards, healthcare, bi-
oethics, privacy, and intellectual property.84 Our goal here is not 
to provide an exhaustive list, but to underline the importance of 
compliance as a policymaking tool. 
There are two legislative efforts that garnered national at-
tention not only because of their subject matter and ambition, 
but also because they had compliance at their core: the 2002 Sar-
banes-Oxley Act,85 and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.86 In both 
cases, a series of high-profile corporate scandals rocked confi-
dence in national markets, and Congress responded not only 
through new substantive rules, but also by demanding internal 
reforms from corporations. 
Sarbanes-Oxley essentially ushered in a federal require-
ment to bolster accounting compliance in public companies, 
which boards often implemented by hiring more compliance pro-
fessionals. Coming on the heels of massive accounting fraud at 
Enron, WorldCom, and other companies,87 the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act mandated that all public companies build effective internal 
control departments, which would monitor front-line employees 
 
 82. The books and records provision of the FCPA is implemented by SEC 
Rule 13b2-1. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (2018) (“No person shall directly or in-
directly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to 
section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act.”). 
 83. See Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797, 870 (2016) (discussing the Annunzio-Wylie Act and 
noting that it “did not define what constitutes suspicious activity, nor did it 
elaborate on the steps that U.S. financial institutions must take in order to com-
ply with this obligation”). 
 84. See generally Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law’s Heartland and 
Frontiers, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 511 (2015) (highlighting environmental stat-
utes related to compliance); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Pri-
vacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011) (discussing 
privacy regulation and compliance). 
 85. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 86. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 204, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (2010) (“It is the purpose of this title to 
provide the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial companies that 
pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States.”). 
 87. See Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 128 (2003). 
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and ensure that accounting was based on correct information.88 
To further ascertain the effectiveness of internal monitoring, 
Sarbanes-Oxley enlisted the help of external auditors, who, 
along with the company’s CEO and CFO, were required to review 
internal controls and attest to their adequacy.89 Besides account-
ants, the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms also touched upon other gate-
keepers, such as securities attorneys, as we discuss below.90 Fif-
teen years after their passage, whether the Sarbanes-Oxley 
reforms have managed to stem accounting misstatements is very 
much in doubt.91 But these reforms certainly puffed up compli-
ance departments, which found themselves with a broader scope 
of work and additional firepower. 
As the 2007 financial crisis fueled further mistrust in com-
panies’ management, Congress responded by adopting the 2010 
Dodd-Frank Act. The sheer size and complexity of Dodd-Frank, 
which introduced over 27,000 new restrictions by some counts,92 
made compliance departments indispensable to companies that 
hope to avoid breaking the law. But Dodd-Frank also included 
some reforms specifically geared towards compliance. Im-
portantly, it introduced a whistleblower regime, which allows 
the SEC to offer to informants bounties that amount to ten to 
thirty percent of overall sanctions, sometimes reaching tens of 
millions of dollars.93 Although the SEC does not require whistle-
blowers to address their internal compliance chiefs before alert-
ing the agency, many of them do, and thus companies have de-
veloped compliance policies so as to better handle whistleblower 
complaints. Moreover, Dodd-Frank required certain private fi-
nancial firms that are not tightly regulated, such as those sub-
 
 88. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 301–02. 
 89. See Catherine Shakespeare, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Five Years On: 
What Have We Learned?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 333, 335 (2008) (“Section 404 
requires an annual audit of management’s assessment of the effectiveness of 
the internal control.”). 
 90. See infra text accompanying notes 237–41. 
 91. See John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 96 (2007). 
 92. See Patrick McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act May Be the Biggest Law Ever, MER-
CATUS CTR. GEO. MASON U. (July 20, 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/ 
publication/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act-may 
-be-biggest-law-ever. 
 93. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 922(b)–(c), 929A (2010) (amending 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A). 
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ject to the 1940 Investment Advisers Act, to develop a compli-
ance department and designate a chief compliance officer.94 
Overall, the role of compliance chiefs became even more promi-
nent after Dodd-Frank. 
The successive reforms of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank 
broadened the scope of compliance operations and introduced 
new institutional links between in-house monitors and tradi-
tional corporate organs, such as the board and its committees. 
These congressional efforts aligned with the DOJ’s corporate en-
forcement strategy to strengthen the position of compliance 
heads and other in-house legal experts within the corporate hi-
erarchy. Yet, whether in-house legal experts would fulfill policy-
makers’ expectations, and in what fashion, remained highly de-
bated. As we outline below, corporate law scholars are generally 
very skeptical about whether legal and compliance experts can 
effectively supervise their employers. 
C. CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARS DISTRUST COMPLIANCE 
As a government-motivated reform, compliance poses par-
ticular challenges for a body of law that prioritizes individuals’ 
freedom of contract, such as corporate law.95 Particularly after 
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, corporate law thinkers sought to 
understand how compliance fits within the constellation of ac-
tors that constitute or revolve around the modern corporation.96 
Business law had long enlisted the help of private actors 
outside the corporation, such as accountants, bankers, and at-
torneys, to monitor it in key moments, such as securities offer-
ings. These professionals, termed “gatekeepers,”97 assure inves-
tors that a company’s disclosures are accurate by putting their 
reputation on the line. On top of these reputational incentives, 
the law imposes liability on gatekeepers who fail to perform their 
due diligence duties and let corporate fraud go undetected. As 
monitoring is also one of compliance’s central goals, legal and 
compliance officers were swiftly categorized by legal academia 
 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(6) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2018). 
 95. See Griffith, supra note 59, at 2130 (arguing that “corporate governance 
is inconsistent with current theories of the firm” which are based on contract). 
 96. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (“The Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SOX) Act . . . is not just a considerable change in law, but also a departure in 
the mode of regulation.”). 
 97. See Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986) (explaining the concept 
of gatekeepers). 
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as another type of gatekeeper. Indeed, these in-house monitors 
share many of the characteristics of the outside gatekeepers. 
They are both part of a professional class with expertise that 
provides them with the skillset necessary to perform their mon-
itoring task. Importantly, it is the failure in monitoring others’ 
misconduct, rather than their own misconduct, which puts out-
side gatekeepers and internal legal and compliance experts in 
trouble. 
As corporate lawyers set out to analyze compliance through 
the lens of gatekeeper theory, their predictions were, unsurpris-
ingly, quite dire. As gatekeepers, in-house legal and compliance 
officers are quite weak. Unlike most other professionals, who 
have a roster of clients, in-house experts work exclusively for a 
single company, and are thus more likely to succumb to pressure 
from management.98 Moreover, their long association with a sin-
gle company may blunt their instincts and normalize illegality.99 
This behavioral bias might be particularly potent for lawyers, 
who are likely to prioritize loyalty to clients rather than gate-
keeping.100 Faced with these pressures, in-house compliance ex-
perts might choose to hole themselves in their offices and avoid 
evidence of wrongdoing.101 Although these pressures are com-
mon for other gatekeepers, they are counterbalanced by the 
threat of liability if gatekeeper approval is provided without 
proper due diligence. But laws rarely require in-house legal and 
compliance experts to provide their approval for a transaction.102 
Without the threat of liability for failing to adequately monitor, 
 
 98. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE 146 (2006). 
 99. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 968 (2005) (“[T]o the extent general counsel participates 
at an early stage in shaping major transactions and corporate policy, counsel’s 
ability to bring detached, professional judgment to bear in assessing their legal-
ity may be compromised, especially when the question of legality is tinged in 
shades of gray as opposed to black and white.”); see also Kim, supra note 14, at 
1037 (“Inside counsel are subject to situational pressures . . . that induce them 
to acquiesce in managerial fraud.”). 
 100. See William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer 
Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57, 89 (2003); 
see also Langevoort, supra note 16, at 957–58 (“[L]awyer self-interest and client 
self-interest are more likely to converge in cognition and corporate culture, so 
that in-house lawyers, especially, are not particularly reliable enthusiasts for 
the socially optimal compliance point.”). 
 101. See Kim, supra note 14, at 1026 (“Even in the face of unethical conduct, 
conformity pressures . . . can lead inside lawyers to remain silent and not risk 
the consequences of whistle-blowing.”). 
 102. See infra Part IV. 
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these in-house officers have less of an incentive to do an objec-
tively diligent job and little to fall back on when pressured to 
turn a blind eye. 
For all its analytical consistency, the gatekeeper-based por-
trayal of compliance is, we argue, theoretically misdirected and 
incomplete. It expects in-house lawyers to act as enforcers, which 
is not in line with either the powers entrusted to them by law or 
with any realistic expectations of what they can achieve. Moreo-
ver, the gatekeeper model leaves out the most important contri-
bution of in-house legal experts. While in-house legal experts 
may not be able to prevent corporate leaders from behaving ille-
gally, they can make it easier to hold corporate leaders responsi-
ble when wrongdoing occurs. This power places them at the cen-
ter of corporate action, we argue in Part II below, rather than at 
the periphery, as current literature seems to suggest. 
II.  DELAWARE’S STRICTNESS PROPELS IN-HOUSE 
LEGAL EXPERTS TO THE FOREFRONT   
Even though legal and compliance experts operate largely 
in the absence of strict statutory mandates and regulatory re-
quirements, as discussed above, they are far from powerless. The 
advent of compliance programs, alongside state and federal rul-
ings emphasizing the board’s supervisory duties, have provided 
legal and compliance experts with a direct reporting avenue to 
the board. They submit to the board information about employ-
ees’ compliance with the law, identifying potential issues as they 
arise from their monitoring and their other interactions. On 
their own, these reports do not have any direct legal conse-
quences. The board is free to choose how much attention to pay, 
whether to investigate further, or whether to table the matter. 
From a legal status standpoint, these reports do not amount to 
anything more than an informal private document. 
Yet, we argue, if the issue highlighted in a report becomes 
the center of an enforcement action by regulators or a class ac-
tion by private parties, the importance of the report changes dra-
matically. As we discuss below, under both current fiduciary 
duty law and federal securities regulation, plaintiffs would ide-
ally want a paper trail connecting the violation they have spotted 
with the board. This paper trail can be readily found in the legal 
and compliance experts’ reports. Coming at the heels of an ex-
tensive investigation by a dedicated compliance department, in-
ternal reports can describe in extensive detail the underlying 
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misconduct. Their primary drafters are either lawyers them-
selves or assisted by others with legal training, and they are thus 
likely to cover all the aspects necessary to ensure a violation is 
established, as prescribed by law. By offering the evidence con-
necting the company with victims’ claims or exposing directors 
to liability towards shareholders, these reports can radically al-
ter the legal landscape for the board and its executive officers. 
Pulling together all the elements discussed above reveals 
how explosive such a report can prove for the company’s board. 
Before receiving this report, the board could validly claim that it 
had no direct knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to un-
derlying violations by its employees, and was largely unsuspi-
cious of the extent of the problem. That assertion may portray 
the board as negligent, but it also relieves its members of any 
liability, since negligence still falls within the contours of good 
faith. Once a damning internal legal report lands before the 
board, however, it shatters the safe haven of negligence and 
forces the board to confront reality. The more detailed the de-
scription, the more plentiful the examples, the more thorough 
the investigation, the less room the report allows the board to 
wiggle out of awareness, forcing directors to face the prospect of 
personal liability. 
The transformative impact of well-informed legal reports is 
very much due to a much-bemoaned turn in Delaware case law 
in the landmark 2006 Stone v. Ritter ruling.103 In Stone, the Del-
aware Supreme Court declared unambiguously that only bad 
faith could render directors and officers liable for failing to mon-
itor illegal activity.104 Much of the corporate law literature la-
mented such a high standard, as we discuss below,105 viewing it 
as practically impossible to clear. Yet, our assessment of over ten 
years of Delaware jurisprudence shows otherwise. The explosive 
growth of internal legal and compliance departments is filling 
the gap, allowing legal and compliance experts to accumulate the 
necessary information and communicate it to the board. In doing 
so, we argue, they drastically alter directors’ and officers’ liabil-
ity calculus. Below, we analyze Delaware’s compliance doctrine, 
showing how in-house legal experts are instrumental in guiding 
the board’s state of mind in every step. 
 
 103. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 
2006). 
 104. Id. at 370. 
 105. See infra Part II.B. 
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A. BAD FAITH AS A FOUNDATION OF DELAWARE’S COMPLIANCE 
DOCTRINE 
Delaware courts’ first major step into the realm of compli-
ance came with In re Caremark, now a mainstay of Delaware 
jurisprudence. Caremark targeted what Chancellor Allen, who 
wrote the case’s decision, termed “an unconsidered failure of the 
board to act,” rather than a harmful or unprofitable manage-
ment action.106 Shareholders complained that the board had 
failed to spot and prevent illegal activity that, having unfolded 
for years, landed the company in million-dollar fines.107 Gener-
ally, the law does not prohibit inactivity, unless circumstances 
exist that should prod defendants to action.108 Thus, to deter-
mine whether failure to act was actionable, Allen had to deter-
mine the conditions under which the board had an obligation to 
monitor employees in the first place.109 
For Allen, the stakes could not have been higher. Since its 
1963 ruling in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., the 
Delaware Supreme Court had declared that boards ought to re-
act when they face red flags suggesting illegality.110 But in com-
panies with thousands of employees like Caremark, operating in 
highly regulated industries such as health care, boards would 
only rarely come across such red flags in their regular course of 
business. Thus, it was clear to Allen that boards could not, in 
good faith, stand back and wait for illegality to become known; 
rather, their duty should be to seek out these illegalities through 
active monitoring.111 And yet, no board could ever hope to catch 
all the illegal conduct of its subordinates, no matter how hard it 
tried. If drawn too broadly, boards’ duty to monitor could engulf 
all boards in liability, as any employee misconduct is likely to 
look preventable in hindsight. 
 
 106. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. 
1996). 
 107. See id. at 964. 
 108. See id. at 971 (holding that directors could only be held liable for failure 
to act if they “should have known that violations of the law were occurring 
and . . . took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation”). 
 109. See id. 
 110. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) 
(holding that if a corporate director “has ignored either willfully or through in-
attention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law will cast the 
burden of liability upon him”). 
 111. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (“[I]t is important that the board exer-
cise a good faith judgment that appropriate information will come to its atten-
tion in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations.”). 
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To balance these opposing considerations, Caremark set the 
foundations of a two-pronged claim, now known as a Caremark 
claim, that defines Delaware jurisprudence in this area.112 The 
first prong directs boards to set up a compliance system. Care-
mark does not specify the components of this system, leaving this 
choice to the board.113 However, the compliance system must be 
adequate “in concept and design” so that the board can expect, 
in good faith, to receive accurate and timely information about 
employee misconduct.114 
The second prong of a Caremark claim turns its focus on 
whether the board, after setting up the compliance system, fully 
discharges the obligations that derive from that system.115 The 
Delaware Supreme Court, which espoused and developed the 
Caremark test in Stone, emphasized that the Board in that case 
actually heard presentations from compliance heads and moni-
tored the operation of the compliance department closely 
through its Audit Committee.116 If the board is shown to have 
received information pointing to illegal actions by company em-
ployees, then Delaware law evaluates the board’s reaction, scru-
tinizing its good or bad faith in doing so.117 
The realm of activity that fell outside Caremark’s two-
pronged test, and relieved the board from any liability, was as 
important as the scope of misconduct it captured.118 Crucially, 
the gap between Caremark’s two prongs is considerable.119 It is 
highly likely that a board could set up a state-of-the-art compli-
ance system, which nevertheless fails to capture employee mis-
conduct that turns out to be highly detrimental for the company. 
After all, if every instance of employee misconduct resulted in 
liability for the board, the law would equate “bad outcome[s] 
with bad faith.”120 As Stone clarified, Delaware courts will im-
pose liability only if they are convinced that the board acted in 
bad faith, i.e. that it either evidently knew, or it can be reasona-
bly inferred that it was aware, of underlying violations of law.121 
 
 112. See id. at 967–70; see also Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Rit-
ter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006). 
 113. See Caremark, 698 A.2d 95 at 970. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. at 967–71. 
 116. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 372. 
 117. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 118. Id. at 967–71. 
 119. Id. at 971. 
 120. Stone, 911 A.2d at 373. 
 121. Id. at 370. 
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Mindful of the risk that any violations undetected by the com-
pany’s compliance system could be used as evidence of its inade-
quacy with hindsight, Chancellor Allen declared that only a “sus-
tained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—
such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable infor-
mation system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that 
is a necessary condition to liability.”122 Bad faith is the necessary 
element that plaintiffs need to prove in order to establish that 
the board has been disloyal to shareholders.123 
B. CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARS DEBATE BAD FAITH 
Once Stone elevated bad faith to the key ingredient of a 
Caremark claim, many corporate law scholars reacted with ex-
asperation. The general expectation was that the bad faith re-
quirement would render a Caremark claim even harder to estab-
lish than previously thought.124 For some, the inquiry into the 
subjective motives of the board, which investigating bad faith in-
vites, detracts from the goal of setting up an objectively adequate 
compliance system.125 By delegating the setup of its compliance 
operation to reputable outside experts, a board could easily es-
tablish a good faith belief in the adequacy of its system, satisfy-
ing the first prong of a Caremark claim. When misconduct arises, 
despite the otherwise adequate compliance system, plaintiffs 
bear the considerable burden of showing that the board acted in 
bad faith, knowingly disregarding red flags. Putting their finger 
on such evidence, critics feared, would often prove exceedingly 
hard for plaintiffs. After all, Chancellor Allen himself intended 
a Caremark claim to be “possibly the most difficult theory in cor-
poration law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judg-
ment.”126 
For these reasons, Stone seemed to further fuel preexisting 
concerns that compliance could act as a shield—or even just a 
smokescreen—behind which the board can readily hide to evade 
its duties.127 Some lost faith in Caremark’s ability to discipline 
 
 122. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Arlen, supra note 20, at 343. 
 125. See Griffith, supra note 59, at 2111 (“Corporate law looks to the motives 
of the board in implementing the system rather than the efficacy of the system 
itself.”). 
 126. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. 
 127. See Krawiec, supra note 69, at 491 (arguing that “internal compliance 
structures do not deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve 
a window-dressing function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced 
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boards, and stoically placed their hopes on federal laws and 
agency regulations, which could quickly outpace Caremark by 
imposing stricter standards.128 Others called for adjusting Care-
mark liability to include shaming sanctions, arguing that corpo-
rate actors care about their reputation as much as they care 
about board liability.129 When the 2007 financial crisis revealed 
that internal compliance leaves many risks unchecked, particu-
larly non-legal ones,130 there was widespread fear that the doc-
trine was failing its promises. 
Against this opprobrium of criticism, defendants of Stone 
fought back by arguing that imposing liability on a good faith 
independent director would torpedo the foundations of modern 
corporate law.131 In this account, good faith encapsulates the 
business judgment rule, which allows boards to take entrepre-
neurial risks without constant fear of liability. The discretion 
that Caremark allows directors in establishing a compliance sys-
tem should be celebrated, rather than maligned, because it pre-
serves board autonomy.132 At least, critics’ tepid reaction to 
Stone might seem premature, especially since federal securities 
doctrine was also exploring concepts related to bad faith and suc-
ceeding in striking a good balance.133 
Even though Stone’s critics and proponents fiercely disagree 
on the amount of effort and resources boards should devote to 
monitoring, they both view Stone’s bad faith requirement as 
largely protective of boards. Our task below is to explore the ex-
tent of this protection, analyzing over ten years of jurisprudence 
in light of the bad faith requirement. The results of our study 
hold surprises for both camps above. We show that, even though 
 
legal liability”); Stucke, supra note 72, at 832 (noting that “too many ethics pro-
grams remain ineffective and corporate crime persists”). 
 128. See Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 
50 (2013). 
 129. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1811, 1850 (2001). 
 130. See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Share-
holder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 67 (2014); Christina Parajon Skinner, 
Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1564 (2016). 
 131. See Strine et al., supra note 21; see also Claire A. Hill & Brett H. 
McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1769, 1770 (2007). 
 132. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: 
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 
1675–76 (2001). 
 133. See Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 719, 738–39 (2007). 
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bad faith is indeed very hard to prove, it is not as impossible to 
establish as critics might have feared. Rather, compliance offi-
cials and legal counsel can, and often do, ring the alarm that pre-
cludes the board from remaining inactive. 
C. LEGAL AND COMPLIANCE OFFICERS AS ARBITERS OF BAD 
FAITH 
The ability of legal and compliance officers to determine 
whether the board remains in good faith or enters into bad faith 
comes, perversely, from the careful efforts of Delaware courts to 
prescribe director liability for violations of law by subordinates. 
In the decade since Stone was decided, a large set of judicial opin-
ions have been continuously trying to delineate the circum-
stances where directors behaved in bad faith, and distinguish 
them from situations where the board showed appropriate loy-
alty and care but calamity nevertheless ensued. To follow Stone’s 
focus on bad faith, courts sought concrete, specific evidence, ca-
pable of drawing a direct link between what happened on the 
ground and what the board knew about it.134 In case after case, 
courts were able to find this direct link when they were faced 
with an internal report, typically by a legal expert or compliance 
officer, informing the board about the underlying problem, as we 
show below.135 
Below, we trace the doctrinal edifice that Delaware jurispru-
dence has built on the Caremark foundations, and outline the 
inflection points developed for each prong. Figure 1 provides vis-
ual guidance. We show that, in every step along the way, courts 
turn to in-house legal experts and their work in order to deter-
mine boards’ good or bad faith. 
 
 
 134. See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[T]he 
complaint does not plead a single fact suggesting specific red—or even yellow—
flags were waved at the outside directors.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137, 1151–57 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Westmoreland Cty. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719, 726–30 (7th Cir. 
2013); In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453, 460 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Horman v. Abney, No. 12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571, at *8 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 19, 2017); In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., 
No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *7–13 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011). 
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Figure 1. Steps in the Caremark Framework 
D. HAS THE BOARD ESTABLISHED AN ADEQUATE COMPLIANCE 
SYSTEM? 
It is not often that courts find a company that has utterly 
and systematically failed to set up a compliance system, as 
Chancellor Allen directed them to determine.136 But when they 
do, courts typically underline the role of lawyers and compliance 
officers in allowing these failures to continue. 
1. Is There an Adequate Compliance System? 
Although Caremark itself does not provide a definition of an 
adequate compliance system, courts have looked at current prac-
tice to reach this assessment. Features such as an Audit Com-
mittee that meets frequently, a well-populated compliance de-
partment, regular reviews, and board level discussions will help 
courts conclude that the compliance system is adequate. In 
Guttman v. Huang, Vice-Chancellor Strine underlined the im-
portance of presenting the court with such data about the oper-
ation of the compliance system.137 He also made clear that, since 
the burden of proving compliance inadequacy falls on plaintiffs, 
 
 136. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. 
Ch. 1996). 
 137. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 507–08. 
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they are much more likely to convince the court if they first sub-
mit an official request for the books and records of the company, 
which can provide them with the relevant information.138 This 
inquiry tends to emphasize processes, rather than outcomes, as 
critics are quick to point out. But processes such as these are 
often at the hands of lawyers, who may find themselves in charge 
of designing and running the system. For that reason, they may 
end up targeted by the court. 
Only extreme defects will lead courts to find a virtual lack 
of a compliance system. One such example involves a company 
that had made no actual effort nor taken any steps to establish 
a financial reporting system, despite Sarbanes-Oxley’s clear pro-
nouncements.139 Eventually, fraudulent accounting, underpay-
ing taxes, and double-borrowing on receivables drove the com-
pany to bankruptcy. The court did not hesitate to fault the 
company’s top lawyer, even though he was not a board member, 
for failing to establish any reporting system that would track 
those failures and refer them to the SEC.140 Another case, Rich 
ex rel. Fuqi International v. Yu Kwai Chong, involves a jewelry 
company that went bankrupt less than a year after its IPO.141 
The board had taken some steps towards creating a compliance 
department, e.g., by creating an Audit Committee.142 But there 
was so little monitoring on the ground that the company failed 
to accurately record purchases, payments, and even its diamond 
inventory.143 The court found that the existing compliance sys-
tem was not meaningful.144 
2. Is the Board Aware of Failures in Its Compliance System? 
Rather than on the virtual absence of a compliance appa-
ratus, such as discussed above, Caremark claims often focus on 
a sizeable gap in an otherwise extensive and well-resourced com-
pliance system. This gap will have come to light after a huge 
public scandal, perhaps one involving numerous tort victims, vi-
olations of regulatory requirements, and sometimes criminal 
 
 138. Id. at 504. 
 139. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012). 
 140. See Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alts., Inc.), 385 B.R. 576, 
592–95 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (explaining that the test promulgated by Care-
mark is applicable to officers of a company, not just directors, and applying the 
test to the in-house general counsel). 
 141. 66 A.3d 963, 967–71 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 142. Id. at 982. 
 143. Id. at 983. 
 144. Id. 
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charges. However, the existence of regular compliance processes 
does not allow the court to conclude that the board has utterly 
failed in its monitoring mission. Yet, the gap in the compliance 
system is not without consequences. Plaintiffs can still claim 
that the board was aware of the problem, but failed to take any 
action to remedy it. This failure of oversight is rooted in bad 
faith, and is one in which lawyers can play a major part. 
This type of claim was at the heart of GM’s ignition switch 
scandal.145 Due to a design defect, the switch malfunctioned and 
turned off the car engine at critical moments, also preventing the 
airbags from launching.146 Although GM employees received nu-
merous reports and lawsuits about the problem, the board re-
mained unaware of the specifics until long after it should 
have.147 Plaintiffs had little trouble convincing the court that 
there was a gap in GM’s compliance process, at least in hind-
sight, aided in large part by the independent investigation or-
dered by GM’s new management.148 More specifically, there were 
multiple board committees with vague and potentially overlap-
ping risk oversight mandates, which blunted board members’ fo-
cus.149 The technical department charged with collecting data 
and submitting reports required by the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Agency (NHTSA) was slow and underperforming.150 
Although NHTSA had complained to the head of that depart-
ment, and some officers knew about these complaints, they were 
never discussed with the board.151 Finally, the legal department 
had received many lawsuits involving ignition switch failures, 
but had managed to settle these at or below a $5 million cutoff, 
and thus avoided involving the General Counsel, who could have 
informed the board if he had known.152 Together, vagueness in 
board committee mandates, subpar data collection and reporting 
by the technical team, and misplaced cutoffs for the legal team, 
combined with a lack of initiative by subordinates, resulted in a 
gap in the GM compliance system, as the court accepted.153  
 
 145. In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 
3958724, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2015), aff ’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016). 
 146. Id. at *2. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at *4–9. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Id. at *8. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at *17. 
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But, besides identifying a gap in the company’s compliance 
processes, plaintiffs must also convince the court that this gap 
reflects bad faith on the board’s behalf.154 To establish bad faith, 
plaintiffs must show that the board was aware that its compli-
ance process was not operating properly, and failed to take any 
remedial action regardless.155 For example, a compliance report 
alerting the board of the looming gap would help to establish its 
bad faith. In GM’s case, the plaintiffs were only able to point to 
reports that identified broad safety risks that called for greater 
attention.156 Although these reports referred generally to quality 
control, none mentioned anything specific about the ignition 
switch problem.157 The court saw these reports as lacking in 
specificity, and found that the board’s decision to take risk miti-
gation measures by delegating oversight to top management suf-
ficiently responsive.158 
In their search for bad faith, courts often look for motives. 
For example, an impending acquisition might help explain why 
the board was likely to disregard indications of overstated earn-
ings.159 Considerable profits from illegal activity might help ex-
plain why the board was keen to disregard red flags.160 Both 
Chancellor Glasscock and Justice Vaughn suggested at the Su-
preme Court hearing of the appeal against GM that they would 
have been more likely to find bad faith if plaintiffs were able to 
point to a specific motive behind the compliance failure.161 Yet, 
plaintiffs at GM were only able to point to idleness and a stulti-
fied, bureaucratic culture within the company as the core roots 
of the problem.162 The court swiftly categorized these as indica-
tions of negligence, in all likelihood, but certainly not bad 
faith.163 
The plaintiffs, lacking outright evidence of bad faith, sought 
an alternative ground for their claims in recklessness.164 To 
 
 154. See id. (“Pleadings . . . indicating that directors did a poor job of over-
seeing risk in a poorly managed corporation do not imply director bad faith.”). 
 155. Id. at *11–12. 
 156. See id. at *17. 
 157. Id. at *14. 
 158. Id. at *16–17. 
 159. See Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alts., Inc.), 385 B.R. 576, 
584–85 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008). 
 160. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507–08 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 161. In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., 2015 WL 3958724 at *16. 
 162. Id. at *15. 
 163. Id. at *17. 
 164. Id. at *11. 
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show that the board was reckless in not monitoring a situation 
more closely, plaintiffs drew the court’s attention to exogenous 
circumstances requiring more intense monitoring.165 For exam-
ple, plaintiffs in In re Goldman Sachs argued that, by setting up 
a highly competitive compensation structure, the board should 
have expected that some employees would be tempted to bend 
ethics rules.166 In other words, the mere change in the compen-
sation structure should have heightened the board’s compliance 
efforts.167 Ultimately, this argument relies not on actual red 
flags, i.e., violations on the ground, but on the higher likelihood 
of violations. As we will see below, arguments about the in-
creased risk of legal problems, but without examples of such 
problems already reaching the board, have failed to convince 
courts that directors have not satisfied their duties.168 
In contrast, when the board is found to have certain and in-
disputable warnings about problems in its compliance efforts, 
and a clear motive to disregard these warnings, courts are more 
willing to find bad faith. Such an indisputably clear warning to 
the board about compliance failures often comes in the form of 
regulatory action requiring the company to intensify its compli-
ance efforts. In Westmoreland v. Parkinson, a pharmaceutical 
company had agreed that one of its products, a medical pump, 
could cause serious harm to patients and undertook to put in 
place a compliance effort to recall and repair these devices.169 At 
first, the board invested significant effort and resources into 
compliance.170 But when the company came up with a brand new 
pump, the board cut the budget of its compliance efforts in half, 
and directed its attention toward promoting the new pump.171 
Throughout this period, regulators continued sending warnings 
to the board, thus putting directors on notice that violations were 
ongoing.172 The board’s strategic choice to promote sales of the 
new pump instead of repairing the old, faulty one provided the 
court with the motive it required, to find that the board had 
 
 165. Id. at *16–17. 
 166. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 
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 168. See infra Part II.E.1. 
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acted in bad faith in reducing the intensity of its compliance ef-
forts.173 
E. HAS THE BOARD FULLY DISCHARGED ITS OBLIGATIONS 
ARISING FROM ITS MONITORING SYSTEM? 
After approving a compliance system in line with current 
practices, boards can readily satisfy Caremark’s first prong. 
However, compliance systems are not intended as a one-time 
adoption of a rulebook, nor as a task fully delegated to others, 
but as an ongoing framework for constant monitoring. The pur-
pose of this compliance system is to keep the board informed, 
generating “red flags” that alert the board when employees look 
like they are misbehaving. Thus, when illegal activity surfaces, 
unavoidably the focus turns on whether the board has fully per-
formed its monitoring role. Plaintiffs, often bolstered by multi-
million dollar settlements with victims, regulators, and criminal 
authorities, will rush to claim that, if failures of such magnitude 
escaped the board’s attention, it surely was a disloyal board. 
These claims are unlikely to go very far in Delaware courts. 
Time and again, Delaware judges have stated that a Caremark 
claim must state with “particularized facts” the allegations of 
failure on behalf of the board as well as its bad faith.174 To satisfy 
this standard, plaintiffs must be able to connect the failure in 
question with each specific member of the board. In practice, 
plaintiffs need to show that the board was aware of indications 
of illegality, that these indications amounted to “red flags” that 
should set the board in motion, and that the board’s reaction to 
these red flags was lacking. Courts often consider the three steps 
above in one swoop, but the paragraphs below separate them for 
analytical purposes. 
Delaware’s insistence on particularized evidence of monitor-
ing failure and bad faith had an unforeseen consequence. Cir-
cumstantial evidence, such as meetings or risk warnings, will be 
heavily discounted by courts. In contrast, internal legal and com-
pliance reports, which inform the board in writing about the re-
sults of a thorough examination, are among the few documents 
that can easily exceed the evidentiary bar. 
 
 173. Id. at 728–30. 
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1. Have Red Flags Reached the Board? 
When Delaware courts demand particularized evidence of 
awareness, they require specific communications addressed to 
each individual defendant that express the underlying red flags 
in no uncertain terms. Preferably, these communications will be 
addressed to the board as a whole. If addressed to one member, 
or to one committee, then they provide evidence of awareness 
only as far as the recipient or committee members are concerned, 
but courts will require further evidence that the reported facts 
were communicated to other directors.175 
Identifying evidence of board awareness has become more 
palatable in today’s digital world, where details of meetings and 
presentations are readily available. Delaware courts have un-
derlined that plaintiffs’ chances of convincing the court about a 
Caremark claim are much higher after they examine the com-
pany’s books and records, typically granted only after a formal 
request from the court.176 Thus, plaintiffs have poured over com-
pany documents to unearth instances showing that information 
about violations had indeed reached the board. 
In their efforts, plaintiffs repeatedly stumble across a key 
limitation. Reports of employees’ violations, or strong indications 
of misconduct, may reach the level of senior staff within the com-
pany hierarchy, but do not get elevated to the board or to top 
management. In Desimone v. Barrows, an anonymous internal 
report that outlined how senior employees orchestrated stock op-
tions backdating reached only one officer in the accounting de-
partment.177 Then-Vice Chancellor Strine not only rejected the 
argument that the board had knowledge, but pointed to the 
memo, which outlined employees’ efforts to get around the com-
pliance system, as evidence that the board had no reason to sus-
pect that something was amiss.178 
Even direct and damning evidence of legal misconduct, such 
as investigations by regulators into the company, must be clearly 
shown to have reached the board. This requirement underlines 
the crucial role of legal officers, who get to control the inflow of 
 
 175. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506–08 (Del. Ch. 2003) (explain-
ing that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient particularized factual allegations 
that would suggest the company’s independent directors were aware of any red 
flags). 
 176. Id. at 504 (noting the plaintiff ’ s failure “to use the books and records 
device . . . to prepare a solid complaint”). 
 177. 924 A.2d 908, 940 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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information to the board. In Horman v. Abney, plaintiffs pointed 
to a meeting between the vice-president of legal and compliance 
and the audit committee, but the minutes indicated that they 
talked only about “significant matters and trends.”179 This cir-
cumspect wording prevented the court from inferring that the 
meeting included a discussion about ongoing violations of law by 
company employees, or about a federal investigation concerning 
these violations.180 Even when reports of the federal investiga-
tion appeared in an internal memo, there was no evidence that 
the memo ever reached the board, or that it was discussed in 
subsequent meetings with legal officers.181 Similarly, in In re 
SAIC, a whistleblower report that never reached the board failed 
to rise to a Caremark red flag.182 In the court’s own words, “Del-
aware courts have consistently rejected . . . the inference that di-
rectors must have known about a problem because someone was 
supposed to tell them about it.”183 
In plaintiffs’ quest to document board awareness, finding 
even a single email message warning about the problem might 
seem like a real treasure. But courts have been reluctant to rely 
on one or even a few communications in order to establish scien-
ter, especially if these communications are not entirely unam-
biguous. The court was faced with such a communication in In 
re AIG, the derivative suit concerning the board’s liability follow-
ing the insurance giant’s near-collapse at the height of the 2007 
financial crisis due to excessive risk in its credit default swaps.184 
Nine months before the government rescued AIG, the company’s 
auditors, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), had submitted two 
warnings to the board’s audit committee about potential weak-
nesses in risk management, without providing additional infor-
mation about the type or extent of the problem.185 PwC also 
 
 179. No. CV 12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017). 
 180. Id. at *12 (stating that the plaintiff ’s argument that board minutes la-
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garding the company’s compliance violations is “wholly conclusory”). 
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 182. In re SAIC Inc. Derivative Litig., 948 F. Supp. 2d 366, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013), aff ’d sub nom. Welch v. Havenstein, 553 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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warned some senior executives, but these were not board mem-
bers.186 These few and tentative admonitions were not enough to 
convince the court that AIG’s board was aware of the underlying 
problems.187 
Apart from reports and emails, plaintiffs have sought to use 
other indications of underlying trouble as evidence of board 
awareness, such as personnel moves. Delaware courts have been 
responsive to this claim only is so far as the departure was 
“noisy,” i.e., the employee explicitly stated that disagreements 
with company practices were behind the move. In In re AIG, the 
Vice President of Accounting Policy resigned due to differences 
of opinion regarding credit default swaps, but neither he nor an-
yone else communicated to the board the circumstances of his 
resignation.188 The court readily concluded that, on its own, the 
departure of a senior employee did not suffice to alert the board 
about potential misgivings.189 
A special type of warning for the board comes in the form of 
press articles regarding violations of law by the company. Par-
ticularly when these articles appear in major newspapers of wide 
circulation, courts assume that directors were aware of them 
without demanding specific evidence that they read them.190 
However, the article must provide specific information for viola-
tions of law, at least to the exclusion of other hypotheses.191 
2. What Constitutes a Red Flag? 
Neither Caremark nor Stone, the leading Delaware cases, 
provide any specific guidance on what constitutes an appropriate 
red flag. But by grounding the board’s monitoring duties on good 
faith, Stone circumscribes the set of circumstances that would 
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 191. Id. at 386 (“[T]here may well be exceptional cases where news coverage 
of corporate illegality is so intense, widespread, and unavoidable that no mem-
ber of the business public could credibly claim to have missed it.”). 
  
2172 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2135 
 
allow courts to conclude that a red flag has been raised.192 Plain-
tiffs have repeatedly tried to push the boundaries of what is a 
red flag, without much success. The section below begins with 
some approaches that were ultimately thwarted at court, and 
concludes with examples of red flags that courts recognized. 
In their regular course of business, boards receive much in-
formation about the company, both about its past performance 
and about its future prospects and risks. Even though each tidbit 
of information is not, on its own, a red flag of illegality, combin-
ing these could help the board realize that illegal activity is un-
derway. Although this approach overcomes the hurdle of show-
ing that the board was aware of the information in question, 
courts are unwilling to infer illegality unless faced with clear ev-
idence. One such example concerns the board in In re SAIC, 
which concerned a government procurement company responsi-
ble for a project that eventually cost ten times its initial 
budget.193 A series of press articles had criticized both SAIC’s 
overpaid employees and relaxed management, as well as the gov-
ernment’s repeated decisions to extend the project despite sub-
par results and cost overruns.194 In the end, SAIC employees 
were paying kickbacks to government officials in order to con-
tinue with the project.195 However, the court refused to infer that 
the board was aware of the illegal practices.196 
Insistence upon concrete proof of both illegality and board 
awareness divided the Delaware Supreme Court in City of Bir-
mingham v. Duke Energy, a ruling that illustrates the limits of 
circumstantial evidence.197 The board of Duke Energy had re-
ceived an avalanche of warnings over the years regarding pollu-
tants seeping from its coal ash ponds into the drinking water 
sources in the area surrounding one of its plants.198 When the 
company self-reported, the local state regulator imposed a very 
small fine and demanded minimal compliance reforms that did 
not go as far as environmental specialists had recommended.199 
 
 192. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 
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Eventually, a burst pipe proved the specialists right.200 Accord-
ing to the court majority, the board had relied in good faith on 
the adequacy of the regulator’s mandated reforms because, de-
spite some of Duke’s managers contributing to the regulators’ 
election campaigns, there was no evidence of collusion between 
management and the regulator.201 Thus absent direct proof of 
quid pro quo corruption, the majority was unwilling to go any 
further to hold directors liable.202 But Chief Justice Strine dis-
sented, arguing that the board was aware of the specialists’ rec-
ommendations, and therefore the inadequacy of the compliance 
reforms undertaken.203 In his view, a proper red flag was in 
place, and no further evidence was required.204 
In industries where regulatory risk is high, and vigilance 
about enforcement actions is constant, boards obtain frequent 
assessments of the company’s performance of its regulatory ob-
ligations, or its exposure to a constantly changing legal land-
scape. Typically, these assessments are the product of outside 
experts, such as auditors205 or external counsel,206 or in-house 
legal teams. Plaintiffs have urged courts to read these assess-
ments as warnings about underlying violations, and argue that 
they constitute “red flags” in the Caremark sense. However, 
courts are unwilling to accept that a report pointing to higher 
risk of violations amounts to a red flag, unless it is accompanied 
by actual examples of violations that are already happening or 
have recently happened. In Reiter v. Fairbank, the board of Cap-
ital One had received at least twenty-five reports between 2011 
and 2014 about the bank’s escalating exposure to anti-money 
laundering compliance risk, but none pointed to a confirmed 
money laundering case.207 The court declined to rely on these 
risk reports as a Caremark red flag, falling in line with the courts 
in In re AIG208 and In re Goldman Sachs,209 which all recognized 
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that a warning about the risk of violations is different than a 
warning about an actual violation.210 
When courts do recognize that the board violated its moni-
toring duties under Caremark, they tend to rely on multiple and 
undisputed red flags from diverse sources. A recent high profile 
case where plaintiffs succeeded on a Caremark claim involved 
Allergan, the producer of Botox, and its efforts to promote off-
label uses of the drug despite the express prohibition of the stat-
ute.211 The red flags for the board came both from internal 
sources and from regulators.212 A senior ethics employee re-
signed after only six weeks at Allergan, citing her concerns about 
prohibited promotions of off-label uses for Botox in a complaint 
discussed at a board meeting.213 The FDA sent five repeated 
warnings to Allergan, expressing its concern about potential pro-
hibited promotions, even though it did not launch a full investi-
gation until it became frustrated with the company.214 Besides 
these red flags, the court underlined that the surrounding cir-
cumstances of the case supported a finding of bad faith.215 Botox 
was Allergan’s main product, and the board closely monitored its 
sales and post-sale customer service, instituting client hot lines 
and targeting physicians whose specialty suggested off-label 
uses.216 Moreover, the sheer volume of sales for Botox far ex-
ceeded the instances of approved uses in the country, suggesting 
that over seventy to eighty percent of the drug was directed to-
wards off-label uses.217 Success of this scale could not have been 
achieved without active promotion.218 This realization provided 
the court not only with a strong indication of board awareness, 
but also with a motive.219 This confluence of factors convinced 
the court that the board had violated its duty to monitor employ-
ees, even though plaintiffs were not able to produce a specific 
board decision to actually authorize off-label uses.220 
Other high profile wins for plaintiffs in Caremark claims of-
fer a similar combination of internal reports raising red flags 
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with circumstantial evidence of board awareness. In In re Coun-
trywide, internal witnesses testified that they had spoken to the 
CEO about the bank’s inaccurate risk measurement, which 
flouted regulatory requirements.221 While the witnesses had not 
communicated these concerns to the whole board, the court 
pointed to the increasing rate of delinquencies in key loan cate-
gories, which exceeded two thirds of all borrowers.222 That such 
an overwhelming reversal of fortunes was not reflected in bank 
reports could not have gone unnoticed by the board. At the same 
time, the prevalence of trades by board members provided the 
court with an additional motive for the delayed recognition of the 
problem.223 
F. HAS THE BOARD RESPONDED APPROPRIATELY TO RED FLAGS? 
By documenting problems and informing the board, the 
chief compliance officer will have fulfilled the main expectation 
our legal system places on her, and utilized one of the main 
weapons in her arsenal. After that move, conventional wisdom 
suggests, it is up to the board to decide how best to respond, tak-
ing advantage of the discretion afforded by the business judg-
ment rule. In reality, we argue, the board’s options are much 
narrower. 
In essence, the board has two options. It can disregard the 
red flags, and face the consequences, if or when they arise. Al-
ternatively, it can respond to these red flags, showing that it in-
tends to address the compliance gaps brought to its attention 
and combat the underlying violations identified. The first option, 
disregarding the red flags, comes with a significant gamble for 
directors, who run the risk of being found personally liable in 
case a problem arises. Directors succumbing to a successful 
Caremark claim are not typically protected by directors and of-
ficers liability insurance, since they are found to have acted in 
bad faith. Generally, directors are loath to undertake personal 
liability, which can come with significant pecuniary and reputa-
tional losses, after protracted and expensive litigation. Inde-
pendent directors, who now form the majority in most boards in 
public corporations, are thought to be particularly averse to this 
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risk, since they will be gambling away their life’s worth in ser-
vice of top managers’ restless pursuit of higher profits. 
Of course, boards can opt to respond to red flags, fulfilling 
their duties so as to overcome any shareholder challenges. 
Boards still have wide latitude to formulate their reaction as 
they see fit. They can decide whether a separate board commit-
tee is needed, what type of staffing or other resources might be 
required, or whether to hire outside help in order to set up a new 
compliance initiative. Nevertheless, the yardstick by which 
board reaction will be assessed is defined, in large part, by the 
reports that identified the compliance gaps and underlying vio-
lations in the first place. These reports set the end towards 
which the board must strive, even if it is free to choose the par-
ticular means it will utilize to do so. 
The paragraphs below describe instances where the board 
chose to disregard red flags, and contrast them with cases where 
the board sought to address the red flags that had been raised, 
some successfully and some less so. They illustrate that, if the 
board wants to avoid violating its duty of loyalty, it really has to 
undertake concrete and effective action. Otherwise, directors ex-
pose themselves to serious repercussions, having lost all credi-
bility in the eyes of the court. 
1. Boards in Disregard of Red Flags 
After courts establish that adequate red flags had indeed 
reached the board, they move on to the next stage of their anal-
ysis, identifying and evaluating board reactions. If the board has 
not really set in motion any response to the problem underlined 
by the red flags, then courts are likely to view inactivity as evi-
dence of bad faith. Two characteristic examples involve pharma-
ceutical companies that, after having been fined by federal reg-
ulators for illegally promoting drugs’ off-label uses, continued to 
do so.224 As a result of the federal fines, both companies estab-
lished extensive new and stronger compliance mechanisms.225 
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But as these compliance departments set to work, supposedly 
reporting ongoing violations to the board itself, the board took 
no measure to constrain illegal activity.226 No violators were rep-
rimanded or fired, no new training was ordered, and no addi-
tional screening processes were set up. In reality, these boards 
did not end illegal promotions, presumably because it was highly 
profitable. In both cases, the boards chose to intensify their off-
label promotion efforts.227  
Eventually, both boards’ lack of response despite such clear 
and ongoing red flags helped courts conclude that the boards 
were acting in bad faith. After a while, federal regulators 
brought new enforcement actions resulting in record-high pay-
ments, which reached a total of $2.3 billion in Pfizer’s case.228 
Pfizer shareholders complained about an absence of board action 
that was so troubling because the newly discovered violations 
closely traced past misconduct, despite clear internal compliance 
warnings in the interim.229 In both cases, courts swiftly con-
cluded that boards’ lack of reaction amounted to a violation of 
their duties.230  
2. Boards Respond to Red Flags 
Many boards do not remain aloof in the face of red flags, but 
take the initiative to address the revealed problems. In formu-
lating their response, boards can rely on the flexibility afforded 
by the business judgment rule. However, if its response is 
deemed clearly inadequate, the specter of bad faith can still 
haunt the board. Courts need to be convinced that boards’ 
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measures are designed and intended to contain the problem, ra-
ther than simply work as smokescreen for any subsequent share-
holder suit. 
Rarely has a Delaware court repudiated a board’s actions in 
more certain terms than in In re Massey.231 Then-Vice Chancel-
lor Strine was aghast at the conduct of the CEO, who consist-
ently ignored mandatory mining safety requirements, while pub-
licly exclaiming that he knew more about mine conditions than 
federal regulators.232 While the CEO’s articulate statements be-
trayed his bad faith, Strine still had to explore the state of mind 
for the remaining members of the board, whose speech had been 
more guarded.233 The red flags were plentiful. Federal regulators 
had repeatedly fined the company, documenting thousands of vi-
olations per year.234 Internal reports were also damning.235 An 
internal compliance officer who had documented the safety fail-
ures was swiftly fired, but brought a high-profile retaliation suit 
against the company and won “punitive damages, back pay, and 
emotional and reputational damages” of $2 million.236 Faced 
with both external and internal warnings, Massey’s independent 
directors decided to react. They formed an independent commit-
tee, met regularly with compliance officers, and even saw some 
compliance metrics improve.237 But they failed to get any results 
on the ground; in the years after the committee was established, 
Massey’s violations increased in number, rather than falling.238 
Nor was the committee successful in reining in the CEO.239 
When a major mining accident hit the company, directors were 
unable to convince the court of their good faith; the court por-
trayed director conduct as merely “going through the motions,” 
and thus insufficient to counter the company’s endemic non-com-
pliance.240 
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In contrast, the Chancery Court praised United Parcel Ser-
vice’s (UPS) board in Horman v. Abney241 for its reaction to red 
flags. Just like Abbott and Pfizer, UPS was sanctioned by federal 
regulators and undertook to install compliance reforms in the 
context of the settlement with authorities.242 After a few years, 
when illegal cigarette shipments reemerged, UPS became aware 
of various potential problems through a presentation from its le-
gal team and an internal business development memoran-
dum.243 But rather than remaining distant, UPS’s board took ac-
tion. It instituted new digital screening techniques to better 
identify violators, it streamlined and strengthened the investi-
gation process, it ordered new and more targeted employee train-
ing, and created a dedicated help line to invite whistleblower re-
ports against offenders.244 When the Audit Committee received 
notice from regulators that they were planning to investigate 
certain UPS outposts, they launched their own internal investi-
gations and either confirmed a problem or concluded that there 
were no violations.245 Overall, these initiatives convinced the 
court that UPS’s board was actively trying to combat illegal ship-
ments, rather than tolerating or encouraging them. 
III.  SECURITIES LAWS’ SCIENTER AND INTERNAL 
REPORTS   
In Part II above we showed that, in response to Stone’s246 
renewed emphasis on bad faith, courts looked for hard evidence 
in communications between the board and the company’s legal 
and compliance professionals, boosting compliance departments’ 
influence. A parallel jurisprudential arc was already under way 
in federal securities law in 2006, when Stone was issued,247 and 
has become even more salient in the last ten years. Rule 10b-
5,248 the most common basis for securities class actions, requires 
plaintiffs to establish scienter, typically by showing that defend-
ants were aware of fraud in the company’s disclosures. Im-
portantly, the landmark 2007 Supreme Court ruling in Tellabs 
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v. Makor raised the evidentiary standards for scienter at the 
pleading stage.249 Thus, securities plaintiffs have to show that 
the board received information contradictory to its public state-
ments, just like fiduciary duty plaintiffs must establish that the 
board received information about employees’ illegal activities. 
This important resemblance between the two doctrines has been 
widely recognized by academic commentators and Delaware 
courts alike.250 
The quest for hard evidence of board awareness makes in-
ternal communications between corporate leaders and their sub-
ordinates as valuable in federal securities suits as they are in 
Caremark claims. Among such exchanges, reports submitted by 
legal and compliance personnel are often the most conspicuous, 
comprehensive, and illuminating. By administering the chan-
nels connecting the board with its corporate subordinates and 
the outside world, legal and compliance professionals become the 
arbiters of the board’s state of mind. 
In this Part, we track the emergence of legal and compliance 
personnel as key players in securities suits, which further en-
hances their influence in the modern corporate hierarchy. Secu-
rities class actions, which overwhelmingly rely on 10b-5, far out-
pace fiduciary duty suits in number or size of damages claimed, 
reaching a Maximum Dollar Loss Index of $300 billion in the 
first six months of 2017 alone.251 The threat of such large dam-
age claims makes it harder for boards and management to dis-
regard legal and compliance personnel. We begin by illustrating 
how central the state of mind inquiry is in this body of case law. 
We show that concepts that are familiar from our discussion of 
bad faith in Part II above, such as red flags and motives, are tools 
that courts often use in the securities fraud context as well. For 
all these reasons, we argue, federal securities jurisprudence fur-
ther amplifies the influence of in-house legal experts. 
A. FRAUD AND STATE OF MIND IN FEDERAL SECURITIES 
DOCTRINE 
Private enforcement of securities laws is a mainstay in the 
arsenal of shareholder complaints against management and 
boards. Once courts interpreted Rule 10b-5 to imply private 
rights of action for shareholders,252 class actions have continued 
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to lay siege to the corporate bastion. Concerned that frivolous 
securities suits disrupt board operation and increase the costs of 
doing business, both Congress and the Supreme Court have 
tightened the state of mind requirements in 10b-5 and de-
manded stricter evidence for meeting them. As a result, the fed-
eral securities law doctrine and state fiduciary duty law now 
closely parallel each other, as regards both substantive require-
ments and evidentiary standards. The paragraphs below outline 
the substantive similarities, while Section III.B below focuses on 
evidentiary aspects. 
A culpable state of mind is at the center of both fiduciary 
duty claims and federal securities claims. Under 10b-5, a mis-
leading statement or omission does not in itself generate liabil-
ity, unless it was made with scienter, typically equated with in-
tent to defraud or at least knowledge of doing so.253 Thus, a 
blameworthy mindset is an indispensable element of securities 
fraud, without which a misleading statement remains a regret-
table accident.254 Of course, intent and knowledge are key con-
stituents of bad faith under fiduciary duty law, as discussed 
above. Despite some initial ambivalence, most courts today ac-
cept that scienter also extends to recklessness, described as con-
scious disregard of consequences so obvious that the actor must 
have been aware of them.255 As a result, scienter closely resem-
bles bad faith in state fiduciary law.256 
A potential divergence between federal and state doctrines 
is that the culpable actor under federal law is, typically, the cor-
poration that issued the securities, while Caremark targets the 
individual directors of the board. In practice, courts have bridged 
that difference. As corporations are fictional entities, courts infer 
scienter by examining the state of mind of the person who made 
the infringing statements or omissions, ordinarily the company’s 
 
(1975). 
 253. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
 254. See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 532 
(2011) (“[A]ny conception of fraud must include consideration of the mental 
state or fault requirements that will apply to the actor’s awareness.”). 
 255. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGU-
LATION § 12:52, at 629 (7th ed. 2016). 
 256. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63 (Del. 
2006). 
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top executive.257 By dismissing collective approaches to scien-
ter,258 courts have placed individuals at the center of the inquiry, 
just as they have done in the Caremark context. 
Despite the overwhelming similarities in the concepts of sci-
enter and bad faith, there are significant differences in other as-
pects of the two doctrines. As a substantive matter, the scope of 
the federal securities laws’ antifraud provisions is much broader, 
extending over any instance of fraudulent misstatement or mis-
leading omission in companies’ disclosures. For example, 10b-5 
violations include insider trading, which falls outside the scope 
of Caremark duties. Only a subset of cases could be brought both 
under the Caremark framework and under 10b-5, typically when 
the faulty disclosure concerns illegal activities by company em-
ployees.259 Moreover, enforcement institutions for the two re-
gimes are only partially overlapping. While Caremark claims 
can be brought only by shareholders, federal disclosure viola-
tions can also be enforced by the SEC, and sometimes the DOJ, 
if they give rise to criminal liability. The SEC also has at its dis-
posal Section 17 of the 1933 Act260, the last prong of which does 
not require scienter in order to establish fraud, but relies on neg-
ligence only.261 But private plaintiffs typically beat the SEC in 
 
 257. See Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective Scienter in SEC 
Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 8 (2009) (“Seven circuits have re-
jected collective scienter in favor of the traditional approach to corporate scien-
ter that requires proof that the person responsible for the misstatement had 
scienter.”). 
 258. See City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 
688 (6th Cir. 2005); Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 
353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) (“For purposes of determining whether a statement 
made by the corporation was made by it with the requisite Rule 10(b) scienter 
we believe it appropriate to look to the state of mind of the individual corporate 
official . . . rather than generally to the collective knowledge of all the corpora-
tion’s officers and employees acquired in the course of their employment.”).  
 259. In addition to providing accurate disclosure to investors, federal securi-
ties laws require corporate boards to maintain a reasonable system of internal 
controls, in accordance with Section 13(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 
15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012). Although this provision was added with the passage of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the 1970s, it does not provide any private 
rights of action, and the SEC was reluctant to utilize it for many decades. 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1; see Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s 
Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 
449, 454 (2001). More recently, the SEC has been bringing enforcement actions 
based on § 13(b). These actions would offer further support for our argument. 
 260. 15 U.S.C. § 78q. 
 261. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697–700 (1980). While this might mean 
that SEC actions are somewhat broader than private plaintiffs’ ones, they rarely 
reach trial, and thus it is hard to know the impact of the different standard. See 
Buell, supra note 254, at 554 (“These [SEC] cases—though not subject to the 
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bringing a civil lawsuit for faulty disclosure, and the SEC joins 
about fifteen percent of these cases.262 Thus, private 10b-5 class 
actions, though not the sole basis for federal securities law en-
forcement, certainly loom large. 
B. PLEADING AND PROVING SCIENTER 
Providing hard evidence of a perpetrator’s state of mind is 
notoriously elusive.263 It is little surprise, then, that Congress 
and courts chose to raise the evidentiary burden regarding sci-
enter in an effort to suppress the volume of 10b-5 litigation 
which, according to critics, had gotten out of hand. In particular, 
the Supreme Court’s 2007 ruling in Tellabs v. Makor emphasized 
the need for plaintiffs to provide evidence at the pleading stage 
showing that fraud is “at least as likely” as alternative hypothe-
ses.264 To successfully plead scienter, plaintiffs need direct evi-
dence that a top executive was aware of specific facts that ren-
dered her statement misleading or untrue. Absent such 
evidence, federal courts have refused to infer knowledge on the 
part of a top officer by virtue only of her high managerial posi-
tion, powers, and responsibilities.265 If they subscribed to this 
view, federal judges argued, scienter would be established in 
every case there was an error or omission, however accidental.266 
These concerns echo Chancellor Allen’s own fears when shaping 
the Caremark doctrine.267  
In contrast, internal reports that establish top executives 
awareness are what courts see as the clearest evidence of scien-
ter.268 These must be specific: dates, sources, and discussion of 
 
special pleading rules for private lawsuits—almost uniformly settle.”). 
 262. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: 
An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 777 (2003). 
 263. See Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 791 
(2004) (“Plaintiffs generally do not have direct evidence going to the defendant’s 
subjective state of mind at the motion to dismiss stage.”). 
 264. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007). 
 265. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 
518–19 (2009) (“Still, however, the mere fact that someone was in a high posi-
tion at a company is not enough, in itself, to create a strong inference that the 
person knew that his statements were false.”). 
 266. See Garfield v. NDC Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006); City 
of Brockton Ret. Sys. v. Shaw Grp. Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 464, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 267. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. 
Ch. 1996). 
 268. Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1068 (9th 
Cir. 2008).  
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contents are needed.269 Negative internal reports must be di-
rectly communicated and unambiguously drafted; scienter can-
not be inferred from general allegations, or even from meetings 
whose content was never recorded.270 Clearly drafted internal 
reports are much more valuable than second-hand accounts by 
staff, such as internal auditors, accountants, or clerks, whose of-
ten anonymous testimony is not uniformly accepted in all 
courts.271 Courts’ pressing request for a paper trail connecting 
the top executive with the violation underlines the fundamental 
role of legal and compliance officers, who are often in charge of 
internal reporting. 
Another similarity with the fiduciary duty doctrine is the 
increasing importance of red flags in pleading scienter. Absent 
direct evidence of a top manager’s awareness, courts are often 
wary of “fraud by hindsight.”272 To overcome this concern, plain-
tiffs typically claim that disclosures’ faults were so obvious and 
severe that managers were reckless in not recognizing red 
flags.273 Characteristic red flags include whistleblower reports, 
or noisy withdrawals of internal auditors and compliance 
staff.274 These are typically handled by in-house legal experts, 
whose contribution is essential in molding them into appropriate 
red flags for the purposes of 10b-5 litigation. 
C. RECOGNIZING THE PARALLELS BETWEEN SCIENTER AND BAD 
FAITH 
The parallels between scienter in 10b-5 actions and the 
Caremark framework are unmistakable. Just as fiduciary duty 
jurisprudence establishes bad faith only if the board had specific 
information about illegal employee conduct, 10b-5 jurisprudence 
finds scienter only if the board had similarly specific information 
that contradicted their disclosures. Courts have explicitly recog-
nized this similarity time and again, and Delaware courts have 
 
 269. Id. (quoting In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d 1079, 1087–88 (9th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 270. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 
1999); Greenberg v. Cooper Cos., Inc., No. 11-CV-05697, 2013 WL 100206, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013). 
 271. See Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 551, 555 (2011). 
 272. See Gulati et al., supra note 263, at 791. 
 273. See Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule 
10b-5: Empirical Analysis and Behavioral Implications, 63 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 441, 471–72 (2012). 
 274. Id. at 474. 
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repeatedly treated the two concepts as equivalent.275 In In re 
Citigroup, the Delaware Supreme Court went as far as suggest-
ing that the scienter-based approach to bad faith ultimately pro-
vides to independent directors the same safeguards available to 
them under federal law.276 These statements suggest that Dela-
ware judges are only too well acquainted with plaintiffs’ tactics, 
and perhaps share some of the concerns that justify constraining 
class actions. But no one anticipated, we argue, that stricter ev-
idence standards would boost the role of in-house officials tasked 
with documenting the internal life of the corporation. 
IV.  PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR LEGAL AND 
COMPLIANCE OFFICERS   
So far, we have argued that by increasing evidentiary stand-
ards on state of mind, Delaware state law and federal securities 
laws ended up empowering legal and compliance experts, who 
are uniquely well-placed to access that evidence. But their em-
powerment has other roots too, arising from a growing body of 
law focusing on legal and compliance experts as internal moni-
tors who can prevent wrongdoing. While it is still rare, legal and 
compliance officers face a growing risk of personal liability.277 
This threat, we argue, further strengthens their bargaining po-
sition vis-à-vis directors and managers. Armed with a new legal 
mandate to set up supervision mechanisms, to investigate, and 
ultimately to report, legal and compliance experts can resist 
pressures to adopt evasive techniques. We discuss three common 
sources of personal liability: laws passed post-financial crisis to 
 
 275. See, e.g., In re Am. Apparel, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. CV  
10-06576 MMM (RCx), 2012 WL 9506072, at *22 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) (stat-
ing that the Caremark framework is the legal standard that Delaware courts 
use to determine whether a director faces a substantial likelihood of liability for 
failure to monitor and properly supervise a company’s operations); Reiter ex rel. 
Capital One Fin. Corp. v. Fairbank, No. CV 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823, at *8 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016) (discussing the Caremark framework in the context of 
director oversight over company operations); In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 
5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *22 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (stating that “[t]he 
Caremark liability standard . . . requires proof that a director acted inconsistent 
with his fiduciary duties and, most importantly, that the director knew he was 
so acting”). 
 276. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2D 106, 125 
(Del. Ch. 2009). 
 277. See DANIEL J. HURSON, COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY—A GROWING 
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARD 5 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/events/labor_law/2017/11/conference/papers/Hurson-COMPLIANCE 
-OFFICER-LIABILITY-A-GROWING-OCCUPATIONAL-HAZARD.pdf (dis-
cussing the SEC’s posture regarding chief compliance officer liability). 
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give in-house legal experts access to, and increased influence 
over, the board and management; the Delaware fiduciary duty 
framework; and criminal liability, such as for obstruction of jus-
tice. 
A. PERSONAL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF FAILURE TO OVERSEE 
COMPLIANCE REGIMES 
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act marks the first time that Con-
gress gave the SEC the authority to discipline lawyers.278 The 
Act clarifies that the general counsel will “be primarily respon-
sible for investigating and advising the board and senior man-
agement on how to address reports of material violations.”279 The 
legislative history reveals that the bill’s drafters believed that 
inside counsel have the power and the responsibility to prevent 
corporate misconduct.280 It did not take long for the SEC to begin 
advising general counsel to assert their authority to the board.281 
Sometimes, regulators consider compliance officers’ powers 
so central that their inactions render them complicit, as if they 
enabled the fraud. In a watershed case, U.S. criminal authorities 
and regulators brought suit against Thomas Haider, the former 
Chief Compliance Officer of MoneyGram, the money transfer re-
tailer.282 Haider marks the first time a compliance officer was 
targeted for failure to design appropriate supervision systems so 
as to constrain violations of the anti-money laundering statutes, 
a highly sophisticated compliance regime.283 The lawsuit 
 
 278. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245). 
 279. Kim, supra note 14, at 1036 (“SEC officials have urged general counsels 
to play a more active role in policing compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley through 
the development of a more assertive relationship with the board and manage-
ment.”). 
 280. 148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6551–52 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement 
of Sen. John Edwards) (“If executives and/or accountants are breaking the law, 
you can be sure that part of the problem is that the lawyers who are there and 
involved are not doing their jobs.”). 
 281. Alan Beller, the Director of the Division of Corporation Finance of the 
SEC, recommended that general counsels claim “[a] place at the table at every 
significant discussion about how [her] company should act with respect to every 
important issue raised by Sarbanes-Oxley, [SEC] rules or other aspects of the 
new environment.” Alan L. Beller, Remarks Before the American Bar Associa-
tion’s 2003 Conference for Corporate Counsel (June 12, 2003), https://www.sec 
.gov/news/speech/spch061203alb.htm. Beller also emphasized that general 
counsels should seek “[a]ccess to the board . . . to assure good behavior.” Id. 
 282. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Haider, No. 15-CV-01518 (DSD/HB), 2016 WL 
107940, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016). 
 283. See Sue Reisinger, Feds Settle First Ever Civil Suit Against Financial 
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claimed that Haider was aware that MoneyGram agents partic-
ipated in consumer fraud phishing schemes, since he had re-
ceived thousands of complaints.284 However, he did not investi-
gate these complaints, fire any of the participating agents, or 
take measures to close the compliance loopholes that allowed the 
schemes.285 Settled in 2017 for a $250,000 civil sanction and a 
bar from the industry, the case represents the highest fine paid 
out of pocket by a compliance officer.286 While still infrequent, 
since Haider, there have been a number of examples of the SEC 
targeting compliance officers individually for “turning a blind 
eye” to corporate wrongdoing.287 For example, in In re Meade, the 
SEC sanctioned the chief compliance officer for ignoring an in-
sider trading scam although he was aware of the employee’s in-
sider status.288 
But compliance officers’ liability is not necessarily tethered 
to some other misconduct. Rather, the mere existence of gaps in 
compliance programs has led to personal liability. The SEC 
brought proceedings against big, well-known firms with large 
compliance departments, namely Blackrock’s investment advi-
sory arm289 and SFX Financial.290 In contrast to Meade, where 
the SEC alleged that the CCO all but blessed insider trading and 
expected to profit from it, the CCOs in Blackrock and SFX were 
not aware of the underlying misconduct.291 But both CCOs were 
 
Chief Compliance Officer, LAW.COM (May 8, 2017), https://www.law.com/ 
corpcounsel/sites/corpcounsel/2017/05/05/feds-settle-first-ever-civil-suit 
-against-financial-chief-compliance-officer. 
 284. See Complaint at 16–18, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Haider, No. CV  
15-1518 (DSD/HB), 2016 WL 107940 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016) (describing 
MoneyGram’s fraudulent activity, including Haider’s knowledge of that activ-
ity). 
 285. Id. 
 286. See Former MoneyGram Executive Settles Closely Watched U.S. Money 
Laundering Case, REUTERS (May 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us 
-moneygram-intl-moneylaundering/former-moneygram-executive-settles 
-closely-watched-u-s-money-laundering-case-idUSKBN1802P3. 
 287. See, e.g., In re Thomas E. Meade, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 
3855, 2014 WL 2601711, at *3–8 (June 11, 2014) (finding that Meade’s behavior 
allowed an employee to participate in insider trading). 
 288. Id. 
 289. See In re Blackrock Advisors, LLC & Bartholomew A. Battista, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 4065, 2015 WL 1776222, at *1 (Apr. 20, 2015). 
 290. See In re SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt. Enters., Inc. & Eugene S. Mason, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4116, 2015 WL 3653814, at *1 (June 15, 
2015). 
 291. See id. at *3; In re Blackrock Advisors, 2015 WL 1776222, at *7–8. 
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aware of gaps in their compliance program.292 The fines agreed 
to upon settlement were somewhat lower, and no bar from the 
securities industry was imposed.293 No matter; both compliance 
officers were ordered to pay substantial fines out of pocket.294 In 
this respect, the Blackrock and SFX settlements seem even more 
draconian. 
B. PERSONAL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF DELAWARE FIDUCIARY 
LAW 
As we discussed above, in In re World Health Alternatives, 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware extended 
Caremark liability to an officer, the general counsel, for the first 
time.295 The court reasoned that the duties of officers and direc-
tors are identical under Delaware law and held the general coun-
sel personally liable for failure to prevent corporate fraud.296 Sig-
nificantly, the court extended this personal liability even though 
the general counsel did not have knowledge of or involvement in 
the underlying conduct, nor did he benefit from it.297 For this 
reason, In re World Health Alternatives went far beyond Section 
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires counsel to report 
a material violation of the law of which she has actual 
knowledge.298 In contrast, and similar to Blackrock and SFX, In 
re World Health Alternatives requires that in-house counsel take 
affirmative steps to provide oversight and “safeguard against 
corporate wrongdoing.”299 
C. PERSONAL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF CRIMINAL LAW 
Regulators are aware that legal and compliance profession-
als can conceal critical information about illegal activity by de-
laying the production of documents, scapegoating lower-level 
employees, and “aggressively promoting exculpatory evidence 
 
 292. In re SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt., 2015 WL 3653814, at *3; In re Blackrock 
Advisors, 2015 WL 1776222, at *7–8. 
 293. In re Blackrock Advisors, 2015 WL 1776222, at *4–5. 
 294. Id. at *3. 
 295. See In re World Health Alts., Inc., 385 B.R. 576, 591–92 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2008) (reasoning that a corporation’s general counsel must be held responsible 
for failure of oversight under Caremark due to their status as a corporate of-
ficer). 
 296. See id. at 592. 
 297. See id. at 589–93. 
 298. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 
745, 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245). 
 299. See In re World Health Alts., Inc., 385 B.R at 590. 
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while dismissing clear and identifiable red flags.”300 Recently, 
enforcement authorities have shown their resolve in bringing 
cases against such legal and compliance professionals. 
Volkswagen’s $4.3 billion settlement with the Department of 
Justice for obstruction of justice is one such example.301 In-house 
lawyers are obligated to preserve all documents relevant to an 
anticipated litigation.302 Volkswagen (VW) admitted that an in-
house counsel, who remains anonymous, gave advice which 
caused employees to delete documents.303 As part of the plea bar-
gain, VW paid $2.8 billion in fines for the failed litigation hold 
alone.304 VW’s “botched litigation hold” became an instant case 
study within the legal community.305 
Although cases against legal and compliance experts remain 
rare, they have triggered a pervasive fear of liability in the pro-
fession,306 as evidenced by a proliferation of professional re-
sources focused on how to avoid personal liability.307 Perhaps 
counterintuitively, this fear of liability has strengthened the bar-
gaining position of legal and compliance experts vis-à-vis the 
board and management. While in the past they could afford to 
 
 300. See Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enf ’ t, SEC, Remarks to Criminal 
Law Group of the UJA-Federation of New York (June 1, 2011), https://www.sec 
.gov/news/speech/2011/spch060111rk.htm. 
 301. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Volkswagen AG Agrees to 
Plead Guilty and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six 
Volkswagen Executives and Employees are Indicted in Connection with Con-
spiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion-criminal-and 
-civil-penalties-six. 
 302. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 303. See Thomas K. Potter III, VW’s $4.3BN Plea to Obstruction for Botched 
Litigation Hold, BURR & FORMAN (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.burr.com/blogs/ 
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-hold (analyzing the legal implications of the Volkswagen case in regard to liti-
gation holds). 
 304. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 301. 
 305. See Potter III, supra note 303 (analyzing the legal implications of the 
Volkswagen case in regard to litigation holds). 
 306. According to a recent survey of compliance professionals, for example, 
nearly fifty percent expected the personal liability of compliance officers to con-
tinue to increase in 2017. See STACEY ENGLISH & SUSANNAH HAMMOND, COST 
OF COMPLIANCE 2017, at 5 (2017), https://d3kex6ty6anzzh.cloudfront.net/ 
uploads/a4/a496eba563ae8cde99b77caf83e101aaa5695580.pdf. 
 307. See generally id. (providing a survey of risk and compliance practition-
ers concerning “the cost of compliance and the challenges financial services ex-
pect to face in the year ahead”); see also DLA PIPER, DLA PIPER’S 2017 COMPLI-
ANCE & RISK REPORT (2017), https://www.dlapiper.com/compliance_survey_ 
2017 (providing a survey of chief compliance officers in regard to “the current 
state of corporate compliance in an era of deepening uncertainty”). 
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be complicit, the specter of personal liability alters that equa-
tion. 
V.  THE HIDDEN POWER OF COMPLIANCE IN PRACTICE   
In preceding Parts, we analyzed the doctrinal foundations of 
modern compliance in state corporate law, federal securities law, 
and personal liability for legal and compliance officers. In this 
Part, we explore how these different bodies of law come together 
in practice to form a coherent regime for governing corporate 
misconduct. To examine compliance in practice, we turn to a se-
ries of mega corporate failures from the last few years—GM’s 
ignition switch scandal,308 Washington Mutual’s mortgage cri-
sis,309 Yahoo’s cyber-security breach,310 and Wells Fargo’s fake 
accounts debacle.311 These cases captivated national attention 
because of the enormous harm inflicted. Millions of people saw 
their hard-earned money funneled to useless purposes, their pri-
vacy exposed to fraudsters, and their road safety fallen prey to 
faulty engineering, resulting in deaths. Addressing these fail-
ures has attracted immense public resources, ranging from reg-
ulatory investigations and sanctions,312 to congressional atten-
tion,313 and judicial resolution.314 Thus, these cases are 
emblematic of the corporate misconduct that compliance doc-
trine seeks to avert or sanction. 
Yet, precisely because of the high stakes involved for share-
holders, boards, and legal and compliance personnel, these mega 
failures also represent the hardest test for our argument. If com-
pliance processes can be easily sidestepped or manipulated to 
exculpate corporate leaders, as critics claim, then such exculpa-
tion would be most valuable in these instances. Our case studies 
show that, rather than the smokescreen critics purport it to be, 
modern compliance often results in serious ramifications for the 
corporate actors involved, including not only top executives and 
board members, but also legal and compliance personnel. 
 
 308. See infra Part V.A. 
 309. See infra Part V.B. 
 310. See infra Part V.C. 
 311. See infra Part V.D. 
 312. See infra notes 326–29, 391, 394 and accompanying text. 
 313. See, e.g., Seth Fiegerman, Marissa Mayer Grilled by Congress Over 
Massive Yahoo Security Breach, CNN BUS. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://money.cnn 
.com/2017/11/08/technology/marissa-mayer-congress/index.html. 
 314. See, e.g., infra note 327 and accompanying text. 
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In all the examples we discuss below, legal and compliance 
personnel found themselves at the heart of the action, and their 
reports and omissions were often the keystone in the legal case 
against the board and management. Court rulings and settle-
ment negotiations concentrated on what management and direc-
tors knew at specific points in time, and often fixated on the chief 
legal officer or the head of compliance.315 In some instances, 
these officers were named in shareholder complaints or targeted 
by regulatory actions.316 This singular attention to legal and 
compliance personnel illustrates that their choices, often surrep-
titious at the time they are made, can literally alter the legal 
landscape for other corporate leaders. 
However, our case studies also show significant variation in 
liability outcomes. Directors and officers are not exonerated in 
all but the most egregious cases,317 as critics would predict. Ra-
ther, the interactions between the board on the one hand, and 
legal and compliance personnel on the other hand sometimes 
lead to liability for the board, and sometimes increase legal risk 
for the legal and compliance officer.318 We offer a typology of po-
tential interactions between the board and its legal and compli-
ance officers, and use the doctrinal analysis above to explain the 
liability outcome in each type, which we illustrate with a sepa-
rate case study. Table 1 organizes our case studies along two 
axes. The y-axis displays the risk of liability faced by the 
board,319 while the x-axis categorizes cases depending on 
whether a chief legal or compliance officer faces a substantial 
risk of liability. Below, we highlight how our case studies connect 
to each other before delving into each one in greater detail. 
 
 
 315. See, e.g., infra Part V.D.1 (discussing the Wells Fargo banking scandal). 
 316. See, e.g., infra Part V.C.3 (discussing the suits brought by Yahoo’s 
shareholders against the company’s executives). 
 317. See infra Part V.A. 
 318. See infra Part V.D. 
 319. Because some of our case studies include settlements, and others in-
volve ongoing litigation, we cannot be entirely certain that they would result in 
liability. Thus, we focus on the most likely outcome, based on the facts and ad-
missions that have surfaced so far. 
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Table 1. Liability Outcomes Depending on Different Communication 
Strategies 
Critics predict that legal and compliance personnel would 
operate in the board’s favor, whether by overlooking violations 
due to a biased check-the-box mentality or by actively colluding 
to exonerate management. On the record, there are no formal 
communications that could place either the board or legal and 
compliance personnel in bad faith. Informal communications, if 
any, remain untraceable, as the upper left quadrant’s heading 
suggests. This pessimistic prediction is indeed borne out in the 
GM ignition switch scandal. GM’s bureaucratic legal department 
failed to notice the frequency of wrongful death suits connected 
to a particular mechanical failure. Though regrettable, this fail-
ure to take note stops short of bad faith, as discussed above, thus 
averting any liability for both the board and its chief legal officer. 
Understandably, the outcome in this quadrant looms large in 
scholarly discussions of compliance, since it lets both boards and 
legal or compliance officers off the hook, despite the disastrous 
repercussions of their omissions. But amidst the disparagement, 
academic literature has overlooked the outcomes in the remain-
ing three quadrants, which we bring to light. Essentially, we ar-
gue, the interests of legal and compliance officers do not always 
align so closely with those of the board. 
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In the bottom left quadrant, titled “traceable,” legal and 
compliance personnel’s reports to the board are on the record, 
clear and precise, thus representing the polar opposite of un-
traceable communications depicted in the upper left quadrant. 
But while legal and compliance personnel vigorously examine 
and report problems, the board chooses to ignore them. When 
scandal erupts, compliance’s reports to the board establish its 
bad faith and cement its liability. In this quadrant we discuss 
the fiduciary duty claims against the officers of Washington Mu-
tual, a financial company that collapsed during the 2007 finan-
cial crisis.320 Successive compliance officers submitted multiple 
reports to the board pointing to legal gaps in the securitization 
of mortgages. Nevertheless, the board ignored the warnings in 
favor of an aggressive loan generation and securitization strat-
egy, which ultimately landed the company in insolvency.321 The 
settlement included rare out-of-pocket payments for board mem-
bers, illustrating the extraordinary reach of well -documented 
compliance concerns. The outcome in WaMu stands out because 
compliance reports were by far the most pivotal piece of evidence 
against the board. 
Often, the record of communications between the board and 
legal and compliance personnel is not as clear as in the two quad-
rants on the left. In the upper right quadrant, titled “inter-
rupted,” reports of violations by low level employees, or indica-
tions of important gaps in the company’s compliance systems 
have reached legal and compliance heads, who must then choose 
how to react. Whether out of loyalty or due to mere negligence, 
legal and compliance officers might be inclined to address the 
problem themselves without elevating it to the board. In doing 
so, they run the risk of a crisis erupting in their hands. In Ya-
hoo’s case, the internal investigation exculpated the board by 
confirming that it was kept in the dark by its chief legal officer. 
It is widely thought that the chief legal officer discussed the 
problem with top executives and board members informally, but 
never submitted a written report.322 Not only did the chief legal 
officer lose his job, but he is the target of lawsuits and enforce-
ment actions. Regardless of the legal officer’s motivations in Ya-
hoo, the outcome illustrates that shielding the board by formally 
withholding information from it is a strategy that can easily 
backfire for heads of legal and compliance departments. 
 
 320. See infra Part V.B. 
 321. See infra Part V.B. 
 322. See infra notes 362–64 and accompanying text. 
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In the bottom right quadrant, titled “incomplete,” compli-
ance and legal officers fail to fully grasp the potentially disas-
trous consequences of sitting on top of sensitive information. Alt-
hough both compliance and legal officers and the board are 
aware of problems, or of strong red flags, they fail to follow 
through. The Wells Fargo fake account debacle exemplifies this 
dual failure. Employees’ eagerness to fraudulently open ac-
counts had grown so out of control that even the press had gotten 
hold of it. For over two years, internal investigations resulted in 
convoluted reports that both legal and compliance heads and the 
board seemed to accept. The compliance machinery was seen to 
be humming away, but the results were toothless, as critics 
would have feared. Yet, once the extent of the misconduct was 
revealed—causing public outrage, and driving customer satisfac-
tion and share price to the ground—both management and com-
pliance officers became targets of shareholder lawsuits and reg-
ulatory actions.323 Overall, the outcome at Wells Fargo seems to 
suggest that a less than rigorous examination of red flags might 
end up engulfing both the board and legal and compliance per-
sonnel in liability. 
A. QUADRANT NO. 1 – UNTRACEABLE: GENERAL MOTORS 
In 2014–2015, the iconic American car manufacturer Gen-
eral Motors recalled 30.4 million vehicles in the United States 
and around the world for defects.324 The most serious defect was 
a faulty ignition switch that caused vehicles to turn off while in 
motion, and prevented brakes and airbags from deploying, lead-
ing to at least 124 deaths and 275 injuries.325 As a result, GM 
was investigated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Congress, and the 
SEC, and attorneys general in all fifty states.326 It also defended 
 
 323. Although litigation regarding this case is still pending, early judicial 
rulings suggest that the case against management and compliance personnel 
has some merit, see infra text accompanying notes 395–97. 
 324. See Neal E. Boudette, Supreme Court Rebuffs G.M.’s Bid to Limit Igni-
tion-Switch Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/04/24/business/supreme-court-general-motors-ignition-flaw-suits.html; 
Chris Isidore, GM’s Total Recall Cost: $4.1 Billion, CNN BUS. (Feb. 4, 2015), 
https://money.cnn.com/2015/02/04/news/companies/gm-earnings-recall-costs/ 
index.html. 
 325. See Mike Spector & Christopher M. Matthews, GM Admits to Criminal 
Wrongdoing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2015, at B1; Jonathan Stempel, GM Settles 
Hundreds of Ignition Switch Lawsuits, REUTERS (June 23, 2017), https://www 
.reuters.com/article/us-gm-recall-settlement/gm-settles-hundreds-of-ignition 
-switch-lawsuits-idUSKBN19E25A. 
 326. See GM Confirms Justice, SEC Probes on Ignition Recalls, NBC NEWS 
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itself against hundreds of lawsuits.327 GM has ended up paying 
billions in settlements and compensation for accident victims.328 
The General Counsel at the time was Michael Millikin, whose 
work at GM spanned forty years.329 Despite the scale of the scan-
dal, there is no traceable evidence that Millikin had knowledge 
of any red flags until after the cars were recalled in 2014.330 The 
General Counsel’s lack of knowledge protected him from liabil-
ity, and also shielded the board from these red flags.331  
The report of the independent investigation revealed that, 
as early as 2005, some GM lawyers knew that the ignition switch 
in the Cobalt could stall while in motion, which posed a risk of 
injury or death.332 In 2005, even automotive journalists began to 
write stories about the Cobalt stalling when drivers moved their 
keys.333 A senior inside lawyer, William Kemp, managed this 
line of cases and settlements.334 Conveniently, GM’s policies only 
required that he seek the General Counsel’s approval for settle-
ments exceeding $5 million.335 Kemp settled most of the cases at 
or below that level, and thus Millikin and the board remained 
uninformed.336 In 2007, Kemp received two crash studies related 
to airbag malfunctions, which concluded that the ignition switch 
failures and the airbag failures were linked.337 But there was no 
 
(Apr. 24 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/gm-recall/gm-confirms 
-justice-sec-probes-ignition-recalls-n88976; see also Press Release, Del. Dep’t of 
Justice, 50 Attorneys General Reach $120 Million Settlement With General Mo-
tors Over Defective Ignition Switch (Oct. 20, 2017), https://news.delaware 
.gov/2017/10/20/gm. 
 327. See Stempel, supra note 325. 
 328. See Joseph B. White, $2.4 Billion, 29 Million Cars: The Numbers Be-
hind GM’s Year of Recalls, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/ 
corporate-intelligence/2014/07/24/2-4-billion-29-million-cars-the-numbers 
-behind-gms-year-of-recalls. 
 329. See Jerry Hirsch, Embattled General Motors General Counsel Millikin 
to Retire, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la 
-fi-hy-gm-lawyer-millikin-retires-20141017-story.html. 
 330. See VALUKAS REPORT, supra note 34, at 227 (noting that Millikin did 
not learn about the ignition switch’s safety threat until after the recall was is-
sued in 2014). 
 331. See id. at 233 (noting that the Board was unaware of the ignition switch 
safety threat until 2014).  
 332. See id. at 103. 
 333. See id. at 7 (noting that newspapers, such as the New York Times, be-
gan covering these stories). 
 334. See id. at 85. 
 335. See id. at 107. 
 336. See id. at 231. 
 337. See id. at 125 (noting that the legal team was made aware of the cases 
and reports in 2007). 
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follow-up. Kemp finally advised Milliken of these safety issues 
in 2014, after GM had already decided to recall the faulty cars.338 
At that point, Mary Barra, the CEO, fired Kemp and three other 
GM lawyers for concealing this information.339 But Barra, to the 
frustration of the general public and Congress, stood by Millikin 
and insisted that he was “a trusted and respected confidant to 
senior management.”340 
If there were indeed any informal communications between 
Millikin and the lawyers, they remained untraceable. Share-
holders brought derivative suits under Delaware fiduciary laws, 
as we have discussed above.341 Even with the help of discovery, 
shareholders were unable to trace any other communications. 
Thus, they faulted the board for maintaining siloed and bureau-
cratic compliance departments.342 Regardless, the Court found 
that this did not amount to bad faith.343 As a result, in subse-
quent cases, such as the Wells Fargo case which we discuss be-
low,344 boards point to siloed and bureaucratic compliance re-
gimes as a defense. But our next case study, Washington 
Mutual, describes the exact opposite scenario. 
B. QUADRANT NO. 2 – TRACEABLE: WAMU 
Back in March 2005, the extraordinary boom in housing 
prices captivated the nation’s imagination.345 Among the easiest 
loans to access were Adjustable-Rate Mortgages (ARMs), whose 
interest rate was low for an initial “teaser” period (up to five 
 
 338. See id. at 224 (“In the same period, Kemp disclosed the Ignition Switch 
issue to Millikin for the first time.”). 
 339. See Bill Vlasic, G.M. Layers Hid Fatal Flaw from Critics and One An-
other, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/07/ 
business/gm-lawyers-hid-fatal-flaw-from-critics-and-one-another.html (noting 
that Kemp orchestrated G.M.’s legal strategy).  
 340. See Press Release, General Motors, Millikin to Retire as GM General 
Counsel (Oct. 17, 2014), http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.html/ 
content/Pages/news/us/en/2014/Oct/1017-millikin.html; see also Bill Vlasic & 
Aaron M. Kessler, At Hearing on G.M. Recall, Mary Barra Gives Little Ground, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/business/ 
senate-hearing-on-general-motors.html. 
 341. See supra Part II.A. 
 342. See In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. CV 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 
3958724, at *16 (Del. Ch. June 6, 2015). 
 343. Id. 
 344. See infra Part V.D. 
 345. See S&P/Case-Schiller U.S. National Home Price Index, FED. RES. 
BANK ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA (last updated 
Mar. 26, 2019). 
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years usually) but rose significantly thereafter.346 Since many 
mortgage holders would have difficulty repaying the post-teaser 
rate, they would likely refinance before that time.347 Many banks 
offered ARMs, but few were more invested in them than WaMu, 
then the sixth-largest bank in the United States.348 WaMu’s key 
strategy was to offer “option-ARMs” that allows borrowers to pay 
nothing in capital and even less than the interest on the loan at 
times.349 When it collapsed, in September 2008, WaMu became 
the largest bank failure in U.S. history, and one of the major 
events of the financial crisis.350 
Both regulators and shareholders tried various legal chan-
nels to hold corporate boards accountable for their actions lead-
ing to and during the financial crisis. Many of these actions 
failed to bring satisfactory results, causing widespread frustra-
tion, because U.S. laws generally seek to protect corporate 
board’s risk-taking prerogatives.351 But in WaMu’s case, defend-
ant board members not only agreed to an over $64 million dollar 
settlement, but also, in an extremely rare move, consented to 
three board members paying out-of-pocket sums to plaintiffs.352 
While insurance proceeds covered the bulk of the settlement 
amount, over $25 million was paid individually by the defendant 
directors.353 
 
 346. See Lisa Prevost, The Siren Call of the Adjustable-Rate Loan, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/realestate/the-siren 
-call-of-the-adjustable-rate-loan.html (“The renewed appeal of ARMs lies in the 
teaser rates offered in the opening years of the loan.”). 
 347. See James Berman, The Adjustable Rate Mortgage: Just Say No, HUFF-
INGTON POST (Apr. 7, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-berman/ 
adjustable-rate-mortgage_b_2593671.html (noting that people would try to re-
finance into a fixed rate when mortgage rates rose). 
 348. See WASH. FOSTER SCH. BUS., WAMU’S OPTION-ARM STRATEGY 1–2, 
[hereinafter WAMU’S OPTION-ARM STRATEGY], http://faculty.washington.edu/ 
rbowen/cases/WaMu_case_10_08.pdf; Eric Dash & Andrew R. Sorkin, Govern-
ment Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/business/26wamu.html. 
 349. See WAMU’S OPTION-ARM STRATEGY, supra note 348, at 2. 
 350. See Gretchen Morgenson, Slapped Wrists at WaMu, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/business/in-a-wamu-settlement 
-with-the-fdic-slapped-wrists.html. 
 351. See In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 
(Del. Ch. 2009) (discussing the “business judgment rule,” which gives protection 
“designed to allow corporate managers and directors to pursue risky transac-
tions without the specter of being held personally liable if those decisions turn 
out poorly”). 
 352. See LaCroix, supra note 38. 
 353. See Press Release, FDIC, WaMu D&O Settlement Summary (Dec. 15, 
2011), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11192a.html. 
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What helped plaintiffs succeed in WaMu were the repeated 
attempts by WaMu’s risk compliance officer to alert the board 
about problems in assessing the risk profile of WaMu’s loans.354 
In a series of internal memos to the CEO, the CFO, and other 
officers, presentations to the board, and written reports, the risk 
officer underlined the problems arising from a hasty, disorderly, 
and indiscriminate loan granting process.355 As a result, compli-
ance officers claimed, the risk profile of loans granted could be 
higher than anticipated, placing the bank in dire straits in the 
event of a change in market conditions.356 Incredibly, by 2007, 
WaMu had already run through nine chief compliance officers in 
just seven years.357 
Though drafted as risk warnings, the statements by WaMu’s 
compliance officers also had clear legal consequences. They im-
mediately raised indisputable red flags that alerted the board 
multiple times and in no uncertain terms, to the carelessness of 
the bank’s loan granting machine.358 Upon receiving such warn-
ings, the board should have shown appropriate care by respond-
ing to risk officers’ concerns in some manner. Perhaps they could 
have ordered a review of loan granting processes. Perhaps they 
could have curtailed the discretion of loan granting officers 
somewhat. Perhaps they could have hired an external firm to 
conduct an audit of their risk office function. Instead, the board, 
believing in the CEO’s goal of expanding WaMu’s loan portfolio, 
did nothing. Plaintiffs argued that this amounted to a violation 
of the board’s fiduciary duties of care and loyalty towards share-
holders.359 
C. QUADRANT NO. 3 – INTERRUPTED: YAHOO 
Few cases illuminate the inescapable conflict of interest be-
tween the board and the General Counsel more sharply than the 
 
 354. Complaint for Gross Negligence, Negligence, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 
Fraudulent Conveyance and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 2, 32–34, 45, 51, 58, 172, 
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2011), FDIC v. Killenger, No. 2:11-cv-00459, 2011 WL 
4440410 [hereinafter WaMu Complaint]. 
 355. Id. (noting that there were continuous warnings given by WaMu’s in-
ternal risk managers regarding the lending spree and risk strategy). 
 356. Id. at ¶ 45. 
 357. See Steven Pearlstein, “The Lost Bank: The Story of Washington Mu-
tual” by Kirsten Grind, WASH. POST (July 21, 2012), https://www.washington 
post.com/opinions/the-lost-bank-the-story-of-washington-mutual-by 
-kirstengrind/2012/07/20/gJQAsPoQ0W_story.html?utm_term=.e50ae0581cb6. 
 358. See WaMu Complaint, supra note 354, ¶¶ 25–30. 
 359. See WaMu Complaint, supra note 354, ¶ 195. 
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Yahoo data security breach debacle. Yahoo has now disclosed 
that between 2013 and 2014 all of its 3 billion user accounts were 
hacked, representing the largest data security breach in history 
by a wide margin.360 The immensely valuable personal infor-
mation that was stolen, such as names, birthdates, and security 
passwords, is currently being bought and sold on “the dark web,” 
an area of the internet used for espionage and criminal activ-
ity.361 When the board finally disclosed the breaches in late 2016, 
it claimed that it never received any information that consti-
tuted red flags.362 Unlike in GM, Yahoo’s Chief Legal Officer 
Ronald Bell was in the know, but allegedly failed to elevate the 
issue to the Board, thus establishing a pattern of interrupted 
communications.363 The board then publically fired Bell and an-
nounced his resignation without pay in Yahoo’s 2016 10-K.364 
1. The Biggest Data Security Breach in History 
Yahoo was founded in 1995 and rode the dot-com bubble to 
a market capitalization of over $125 billion by 2000.365 In 2008, 
Yahoo was at its heyday and declined Microsoft’s unsolicited 
$44.6 billion acquisition offer.366 But by 2015 its revenues had 
dwindled and it was preparing to be acquired by Verizon for an 
original offer of $4.8 billion.367 Trouble for Yahoo continued when 
on September 22, 2016, during acquisition talks with Verizon, it 
 
 360. See Taylor Armerding, The 17 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Cen-
tury, CSO ONLINE (Jan. 26, 2018), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/ 
data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html; Yahoo Pro-
vides Notice, supra note 6.  
 361. See Vindu Goel & Nicole Perlroth, Hacked Yahoo Data Is for Sale on 
Dark Web, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/ 
technology/hacked-yahoo-data-for-sale-dark-web.html. 
 362. Id. (noting that Yahoo claimed it did not know of the breach until en-
forcement authorities went to the company). 
 363. See Yahoo 2016 10-K, supra note 40, at 46–47 (“The Committee found 
that the relevant legal team had sufficient information to warrant substantial 
further inquiry in 2014, although they did not sufficiently pursue it.”). 
 364. See id. at 47. 
 365. See Myles Udland, This Chart of Yahoo’s Market Cap Is Just the Most 
Outrageous Thing, BUS. INSIDER (July 25, 2016), http://www.businessinsider 
.com/yahoo-market-cap-over-time-2016-7. 
 366. See Miguel Helft & Andrew R. Sorkin, Microsoft Withdraws Bid for Ya-
hoo, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/technology/ 
04soft.html. 
 367. See Brian Solomon, Yahoo Sells to Verizon in Saddest $5 Billion Deal 
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announced that at least 500 million of its accounts were hacked 
in late 2014 by “a state-sponsored actor.”368 The U.S. Justice De-
partment indicted two Russian intelligence officers in March 
2017, marking the first time that federal prosecutors brought cy-
bercrime charges against Russian government officials.369 Ac-
cording to the indictment,370 the Russian government used infor-
mation it obtained through the hack to spy on targets in the 
United States, including officials in the White House and U.S. 
military.371 Yahoo’s valuation took an immediate hit and Verizon 
dropped its offer by $350 million,372 closing on June 8, 2017 at 
$4.48 billion.373 But four months later, in October 2017, Yahoo 
tripled its earlier estimate and revealed all three billion of its 
user accounts had been hacked.374 
2. The Independent Investigation Blames the Chief Legal 
Officer for Interrupted Communication 
In its 2017 public disclosures, Yahoo pointed the finger at 
its Chief Legal Officer Ronald Bell and stated he failed to dis-
close “red flags” to the board. Yahoo’s 2017 10-K states, 
[T]he Committee found that the relevant legal team had sufficient in-
formation to warrant substantial further inquiry in 2014, and they did 
not sufficiently pursue it. As a result, the 2014 Security Incident was 
not properly investigated and analyzed at the time, and the Company 
was not adequately advised with respect to the legal and business risks 
associated with the 2014 Security Incident.375  
The disclosures emphasized the board’s lack of knowledge: “[t]he 
 
 368. See An Important Message to Yahoo Users on Security, BUS. WIRE (Sept. 
22, 2016), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160922006198/en/ 
Important-Message-Yahoo-Users-Security. 
 369. See Vindu Goel & Eric Lichtblau, Russian Agents Were Behind Yahoo 
Hack, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
03/15/technology/yahoo-hack-indictment.html. 
 370. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Charges Russian FSB Of-
ficers and Their Criminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions of Email 
Accounts (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-russian-fsb 
-officers-and-their-criminal-conspirators-hacking-yahoo-and-millions. 
 371. See id. (noting that the hackers went after Russian and U.S. govern-
ment officials, Russian journalists, and large commercial entities). 
 372. See Yahoo 2016 10-K, supra note 40, at 131; Vindu Goel, Verizon Will 
Pay $350 Million Less for Yahoo, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/technology/verizon-will-pay-350-million-less-for 
-yahoo.html. 
 373. See Press Release, Verizon, Verizon to Acquire Yahoo’s Operating Busi-
ness (July 25, 2016), http://www.verizon.com/about/news/verizon-acquire 
-yahoos-operating-business. 
 374. See Yahoo Provides Notice, supra note 6. 
 375. See Yahoo 2016 10-K, supra note 40, at 47. 
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Independent Committee also found that the Audit and Finance 
Committee and the full Board were not adequately informed of 
the full severity, risks, and potential impacts of the 2014 Secu-
rity Incident and related matters.”376 As a result, the CEO’s com-
pensation was docked, but Bell was signaled out as the only em-
ployee who would lose his job. In case there was any doubt, the 
disclosures publicly shamed Bell, stating that, “[n]o payments 
are being made to Mr. Bell in connection with his resignation.”377 
Bell’s public and apparently forced resignation triggered an out-
cry in the legal community.378 Fellow general counsels from tech-
nology giants like Twitter tweeted their support for Bell, and lo-
cal technology newspapers published stories with headlines like, 
“Silicon Valley GCs Defend Ron Bell; Say He’s The Fall Guy.”379 
3. Plaintiffs Challenge the Board’s Account of Interrupted 
Communication 
The impact on Yahoo was swift and severe, and is ongoing. 
Yahoo is the subject of federal, state, and even foreign investiga-
tions by regulatory bodies including the SEC, FTC, U.S. Attor-
ney, and various state Attorneys General.380 In addition, Yahoo 
faces a storm of litigation brought by consumers—a staggering 
forty-three consumer class actions.381 Angered by the extent of 
harm to the company, investors have also attempted to hold the 
board accountable. Shareholders have brought federal securities 
 
 376. See id. 
 377. See id. 
 378. Twitter’s general counsel Vijaya Gadde tweeted, “I don’t know what 
happened at Yahoo but I know it’s easy to blame the lawyers . . . I also know 
that Ron Bell is a good lawyer.” Vijaya Gadde (@vijaya), TWITTER (Mar. 1, 2017, 
3:58 PM), https://twitter.com/vijaya/status/837089571074519040?lang=en. 
Scott Moore, a former Senior Vice President at Yahoo also tweeted, “Ridiculous. 
I know @ronsbell_tech who is a good man and as a lawyer he wasn’t in charge 
of security @Yahoo #lame CYA move @marissamayer.” Scott Moore 
(@scottm00re), TWITTER (Mar. 1, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
scottm00re/status/837096533669523456. 
 379. See Ruiz, supra note 44. 
 380. Aruna Viswanatha & Robert McMillan, Yahoo Faces SEC Probe Over 
Data Breaches, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo 
-faces-sec-probe-over-data-breaches-1485133124.  
 381. See Vindu Goel, Yahoo’s Top Lawyer Resigns and C.E.O. Marissa Mayer 
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claims under both 10(b) and 20(a)382 and filed derivative actions 
for fiduciary duty violations in both Delaware and California.383 
The allegations in the complaints are heavily focused on the 
existence, adequacy, and frequency of written communication 
between inside legal counsel and the board. Some plaintiffs384 
allege that the board attempted to avoid liability by ensuring 
that the communication between the board and the legal depart-
ment would remain interrupted. For example, they claim that 
that Yahoo “did not maintain minutes” for meetings where the 
data breaches were discussed, “failed to document the discus-
sions” they had about the breaches, and engaged in “active at-
tempts to not document the most incriminating information the 
Board discussed.”385 Other plaintiffs opted to include Bell as a 
defendant on the theory that he breached his fiduciary duties of 
oversight and supervision by failing to protect Yahoo’s data.386 
Still others point to specific machinations by Ronald Bell and the 
board including the use of code names such as “Siberia” in 
memos prepared by the legal department to refer to the 
breaches.387 
To sum up, there is a familiar pattern in these and numer-
ous other cases pending against Yahoo. Plaintiffs, whether in-
vestors or users, are trying to penetrate the shield of interrupted 
communication that the board is using as a defense. Some plain-
tiffs base their claim on evidence of the chief legal counsel’s ap-
parent knowledge and target him directly for not actively react-
ing. Other plaintiffs do not name Bell at all, but attempt to 
reveal how the board was using him as a liability shield. Regard-
less of these differences, the outcome of these cases will rest on 
whether the information between legal and the Board in fact re-
mained interrupted. 
 
 382. See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial ¶¶ 165–66, Spain v. Mayer, 
No. 17CV307054 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cty. Ct. Mar. 7, 2017) [hereinafter 
Complaint, Spain v. Mayer] (discussing the derivative claim and futility). 
 383. See id.; Complaint, Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Brandt, 
C.A. No. 2017-0133-SG (Del. Ch. filed Feb. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Complaint, 
Okla. Firefighters]. 
 384. See Complaint, Okla. Firefighters, supra note 383, ¶¶ 9–12. 
 385. Id. ¶¶ 12, 116. 
 386. See Complaint, Spain v. Mayer, supra note 382, ¶ 40. 
 387. Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 104, In re Yahoo! Inc. 
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., Nos. 16-MD-02752, 5:16-CV-06990, (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 19, 2016), 2016 WL 9710969.  
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D. QUADRANT NO. 4 – INCOMPLETE: WELLS FARGO 
While Wells Fargo was one of the few major banks to have 
emerged from the financial crisis on a white horse, its currently 
unfolding fake account scandal reflects some of the darkest days 
in banking history. Wells Fargo has now admitted to opening an 
eye-popping 3.5 million fake bank accounts by forging client sig-
natures.388 The Los Angeles Times broke the story of Wells 
Fargo’s “relentless pressure to sell” in 2013, exposing the scan-
dal.389 The bank has already paid upwards of $185 million in 
fines to various regulatory bodies,390 suffered what some have 
estimated to be a forty percent relative hit to its stock price,391 
and it continues to battle private lawsuits and pay settlements 
to the tune of over $140 million.392 Perhaps the biggest hit came 
on February 2, 2018, when the Federal Reserve restricted 
growth by assets until Wells Fargo improved its risk assessment 
and governance, effectively prohibiting it from taking net addi-
tional deposits.393 The Federal Reserve also pushed for, without 
directly mandating, the resignation of any Wells Fargo’s board 
members who had served during the scandal and still remained 
on the board.394  
Given the scale of the scandal, it is no surprise that share-
holders took aim at the board and executives, and brought a 
shareholder derivative action in February 2017.395 The action 
has survived a motion to dismiss and Wells Fargo directors and 
officers are now defending against both Delaware fiduciary duty 
 
 388. Laura J. Keller, Wells Fargo Boosts Fake-Account Estimate 67% to 3.5 
Million, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-08-31/wells-fargo-increases-fake-account-estimate-67-to-3-5 
-million.  
 389. See Reckard, supra note 45. 
 390. See Matt Levine, Wells Fargo Opened a Couple Million Fake Accounts, 
BLOOMBERG: OPINION (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ 
articles/2016-09-09/wells-fargo-opened-a-couple-million-fake-accounts. 
 391. See John Maxfield, Chart: The Cost of Wells Fargo’s Sales Scandal, THE 
MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/09/06/chart 
-the-cost-of-wells-fargos-sales-scandal.aspx. 
 392. See David Ng, Judge Approves $142-Million Class-Action Settlement in 
Wells Fargo Sham Accounts Scandal, L.A. TIMES (July 9, 2017), http://www 
.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-settlement-20170709-story.html. 
 393. Emily Flitter et al., Federal Reserve Shackles Wells Fargo After Fraud 
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/ 
business/wells-fargo-federal-reserve.html. 
 394. See id. 
 395. See Consolidated Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, In re 
Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 3:16-CV-05541, (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
4, 2017), 2017 WL 1044785.  
  
2204 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2135 
 
and federal security law claims.396 In allowing the case to pro-
ceed, the court cited “red flags” that included communications 
between employees and board members, multiple lawsuits, em-
ployee terminations, and the L.A. Times articles.397 As we dis-
cuss below, information about fraudulent sales practices first 
reached the legal and compliance personnel at Wells Fargo, and 
then the board itself at various times over the last five years.398 
But instead of getting to the bottom of the problem, legal and 
compliance personnel opted for incomplete communications to 
the board.399 Though officially displeased, the board did not take 
further action on the ground until the scandal was revealed. 
1. Legal and Compliance Personnel Become Aware of 
Problems 
In determining how much information about the scandal 
reached the board, the actions of Michael Loughlin, the Chief 
Risk Officer (CRO) who led compliance, and James Strother, the 
General Counsel (GC), were instrumental. Though neither had 
the authority to enforce changes to the bank’s practices on the 
ground, they both sat on the bank’s Executive Risk Management 
Committee (ERMC), tasked with reporting, evaluating, and es-
calating issues to the Board.400 The committee met monthly and 
advised the board quarterly.401 Dating to as far back as 2002, 
Wells Fargo’s low-level lawyers and compliance officers had en-
countered sales integrity issues, but failed to escalate them to 
their respective heads because they viewed them as minor 
risks.402 By 2012, Loughlin was sufficiently concerned about 
shady sales practices to ask bank executives for a report to the 
EMRC.403 Though “very dissatisfied” with the thoroughness of 
the report, the EMRC did not pursue a formal investigation.404 
Instead, at Loughlin’s request, the board agreed to hire hun-
dreds more compliance professionals and allocate considerably 
more funding to the compliance function.405 
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2. Press Articles Raise Red Flags 
In October and December 2013, the Los Angeles Times pub-
lished two articles exposing an investigation by Los Angeles 
County into Wells Fargo’s sales practices.406 The articles’ claims 
were in line with the findings of an internal inquiry by the En-
terprise Services Division, about which both the GC and CRO 
were extensively briefed. With the scandal already spilling over 
to the public domain, the response inside the bank would be crit-
ical for any future litigation or regulatory procedure. The legal 
department chose inaction, and “did not further escalate the ex-
istence or details of the investigation to the Board or any Board 
Committees at that time.”407 In contrast, the CRO initially iden-
tified sales practices as a “significant risk” in written memos to 
the board in early 2014,408 but did not provide detailed infor-
mation, and backtracked on the risk estimate within a year. At 
the time, neither the compliance department conducted an in-
vestigation, nor did the board ask for one.409  
3. Legal and Compliance Officers Opt for Incomplete 
Communications 
On May 4, 2015, the Los Angeles City Attorney filed a law-
suit against Wells Fargo for its sales practices, which triggered 
a series of inquiries by regulatory bodies.410 This caught the at-
tention of the board, which asked the GC and the Head of Com-
munity Banking, Carrie Tolstedt, for a presentation at their next 
meeting.411 The in-house lawyers and banking executives ap-
peared to wrangle and negotiate back and forth on the drafts of 
the board presentation, eventually settling on omitting key in-
formation. The board’s risk committee was “highly critical” of the 
presentation and claimed that they were “blindsided” by the fact 
that as many as 230 employees were terminated because of the 
sales practices.412 What the board did not know, however, was 
that the curtain was lifted only a little—the actual aggregate 
number of terminations was in fact closer to 1500 employees.413 
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The board turned to the CRO, Loughlin, who assured the board 
that he would conduct a third-party review of the sales practices, 
and asked for additional resources.414 At the direction of the 
board, the risk function was expanding rapidly with significantly 
increased budgets and staffing. But the board did not investigate 
further the immediate scandal. For most of 2016, “Board mem-
bers still understood it to be mostly a Southern California prob-
lem with terminations in the range of 230.”415 
In September 2016, Wells Fargo announced that it would 
pay $100 million to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
the largest fine ever imposed by the agency, $35 million to the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and a $50 million set-
tlement to Los Angeles.416 The board only learned that approxi-
mately 5300 employees had been terminated for sales practices 
violations through these settlements.417 In addition to the settle-
ments, congressional hearings led by Senator Elizabeth Warren 
made headlines and delighted the general public as she grilled 
Wells Fargo’s leadership.418 With the curtain now fully drawn 
back, the board members were forced onto the public stage, 
where they had to act immediately. They met in September, fired 
Carrie Tolstedt, and rescinded CEO Stumpf ’s unvested compen-
sation and bonus.419 The board also accelerated the buildout of 
its compliance department. In 2016 and 2017, over 5200 compli-
ance employees were realigned to report to the CRO.420 
Overall, the typology we offer above helps improve our un-
derstanding of how interactions between the board and its legal 
and compliance officers, before a corporate failure becomes pub-
lic, formulate the liability outcomes later. Although criticisms of 
compliance have traditionally focused on an archetypal align-
ment of interests between the board and its legal and compliance 
officers, we show that, although untraceable communications is 
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a possible outcome, it is not the only one. In contrast, we illus-
trate a variety of strategies that legal and compliance officers 
followed once in possession of incriminating information. Their 
choices, and the ensuing board reaction, become the focus of 
shareholder litigation after massive scandals. 
CONCLUSION 
Traditional corporate law theory portrays the board as the 
ultimate monitor of shareholders’ interests, watching over man-
agement’s actions. But for decades, this theoretical construct 
seemed to have little bite in reality, since prevailing in Caremark 
claims was notoriously hard. Nowadays, Caremark plaintiffs 
and regulators stand a better chance, we argue, due to the stag-
gering growth of compliance, which can produce the evidentiary 
record that opens the path toward board liability. In turn, the 
power to control this evidentiary path grants chief legal and com-
pliance officers more influence over the board. Thus, we have in-
troduced in the corporate law debate new actors, whose incen-
tives and motivations are instrumental in deterring corporate 
wrongdoing. Below, we discuss the implications of our argument 
for future research and for policymaking. 
The typology we offered in Part V illustrates not only the 
critical role of chief legal and compliance officers, but also the 
diverse choices they make. To better grasp what leads to these 
choices, further research is necessary. One potential direction in 
this inquiry is the institutional makeup of compliance. Because 
setting up compliance departments has been largely left to com-
panies’ discretion, there is wide variation in structure, powers, 
and resources available. For example, there is a heated debate 
over whether the roles of chief legal and compliance officer 
should be combined.421 This variation can be leveraged for em-
pirical studies of successful compliance operations. Moreover, 
since the influence of these corporate actors is only now becom-
ing clear, a closer account of their experiences, interests, back-
grounds, and professional goals would help us better understand 
their motivations. 
For policymakers, who have been key drivers behind the 
compliance revolution, our analysis above shows what has been 
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achieved, but also how much is still left to do. As we have dis-
cussed above, policymakers have already understood that simply 
requiring companies to hire more compliance officers will not be 
effective, unless accompanied by changes in governance, such as 
providing a reporting avenue to the board. Professional associa-
tions, outside counsel, and other bodies are formulating best 
practices for compliance operations.422 The structure of legal and 
compliance oversight has become a primary focus for institu-
tional investors, who are concerned about the potential fall-
out.423 For those interested in boosting board accountability, this 
is a fertile ground for further intervention. 
As the choices legal and compliance officers make in com-
municating with the board have far-reaching repercussions, pol-
icymakers might consider ways to further empower the heads of 
legal and compliance departments. One such tool consists in 
providing specific guidelines for how to structure reports and 
identify red flags, as is the case in anti-money laundering laws. 
Another boost to the standing of these officers within the corpo-
ration could come through broadening their liability for compli-
ance failures. With the threat of legal sanctions over their heads, 
legal and compliance officers might be more steadfast toward 
company executives who ask them to ignore malfeasance. For 
now, instances of legal and compliance professionals being held 
personally liable for corporate misconduct remain rare. 
Legal and compliance heads are particularly important in 
moments of crisis. At these times, companies turn to their gen-
eral counsel not only for managing the fallout from past wrong-
doing, but also for future leadership. Too often, the capabilities 
and skills of visionary CEOs are not particularly well suited to 
steering the company through the tumultuous waters of corpo-
rate calamity. Sometimes, the CEOs themselves are embroiled 
in crisis. Instead, chief legal and compliance officers are called 
upon to reform how the company does business, behaves towards 
its employees and competitors, and manages its resources. To 
achieve this turnaround, companies often hire new high-profile 
lawyers who are given extensive powers and resources. Follow-
ing a year of successive crises, Uber CEO, Dara Khosrowshahi’s 
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first major hire was a new general counsel, Tony West, who had 
gotten his previous company, Pepsi, recognized as one of the 
world’s most ethical companies ten years in a row.424 Wells Fargo 
recently named Allen Parker, former managing partner of Cra-
vath Swaine & Moore LLP, to head its legal department, empha-
sizing his expertise in ethical leadership.425 Once the backwaters 
of the legal profession, the chief legal counsel role has become 
the domain of legal superstars. 
These moves confirm the meteoric rise of compliance as a 
core corporate function, firmly ensconced among the key duties 
of the board. In the modern workplace, oversight is ubiquitous, 
and violations of law have severe consequences all the way to top 
management. We are only now beginning to see the muscle of 
compliance in full action. 
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